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ABSTRACT
This study explores the legislative history of Senate television,
examining the propostion that changes in the Senate’s membership in the
1980s contributed to the body allowing itself to be televised for the first
time in 1986.
The paper examines the historical relationship between the media
and members of Congress and traces the history of media coverage of the
Congress, looking at the outcome of legislation introduced in both the
House and Senate dealing with the introduction of radio mikes or
television cameras into their respective chambers. A chapter of the study
is devoted to the history of the passage of Senate Resolution 28 in 1986,
which allowed gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the Senate for the
first time.
The study suggests that generational changes in the Senate in the
1980s contributed significantly to the passage of Senate Resolution 28. By
comparing a 1982 vote on Senate television and the 1986 vote which
approved the project, it was found that younger, newer breed politicians,
with more experience and ease with television, were more amenable to
allowing television coverage of the Senate than were the older generation
of senators who they replaced.
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LIGHTS, CAMERAS, QUORUM CALL:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION

CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONGRESSIONAL-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP
To better understand the U.S. Senate’s decision to televise its proceedings
in the summer of 1986, it may be wise to first look at the traditional relationship
between Congress and the media as well as examine the history leading up to
the Senate’s decision.
The relationship between members of Congress and the media, as it is
with other popularly elected officials, including the president, has been charac
terized in most academic literature as a symbiotic or reciprocal one. As Michael
Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar point out in “Portraying the
President: The White House and the News Media:”
Continuing forces shape both [the media and the president] more than
specific incidents, however traumatic, or the impact of particular personalities,
however unusual. What’s more, the cooperative elements in this relationship are
at least as strong as those that are antagonistic, for a fundamental reason:
presidents and news people depend on each other in their efforts to do the job
for which they are responsible. (Grossman and Kumar, p. 14)
Political scientist Timothy E. Cook compares the ongoing stmggle
between press and politician to the couple fighting to see who will lead the
dance. He writes that the conflict between the two is predictable, but that it is
“bounded and regulated, whether by a shared presumption of ground rules or by
formal mechanisms of conflict management. In the process, no one ends up
being consistently dominant.” (Cook, p. 30) As former Washington Post White
House correspondent Lou Cannon remarked, “The payoff on the symbiotic
relationship is news for the correspondent and tenure for the politician.”
2
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(Cannon, p. 183)
In a democratic society where the media is privately held and not
government controlled, members of Congress rely on the media, in much the
same way as the president does, to disseminate information about the working
of government and policy choices that are being made on behalf of the people.
On a more parochial or self-interested level, members rely on the media to give
themselves and their issue positions publicity. Most U.S. Senators, along with
most Representatives, have designated one of more of their staff to maintain
contact with journalists. The work of these employees ranges from writing and
issuing press releases on their boss’s work, answering inquiries from reporters,
setting up press interviews for the Senator or other members of the staff, or
issuing statements on breaking news. Writing in 1962, Representative Clem
Miller nicely summed up the need Congressmen have for the press and for press
coverage. “If the press did not report Congress, Congress could hardly function.
If the sound of congressional voices carried no farther than the bare walls of the
chambers, Congress could disband.” (Miller in “Guide to Congress,” p. 737) Or,
looking at the relationship from the Congressman’s viewpoint, Douglas Cater
points out that “the member of Congress is uniquely creator and creature of
publicity. It is the nature of his job to be concerned with that amorphous
substance known as public opinion.” (Cater in Cannon, p. 186)
The importance of the media and its reporting on members takes on added
importance when it’s taken into account that few Americans understand the
complex machinations of their Congress. Congress’ piecemeal approach to
making policy, combined with arcane internal rules and constraints, often times
leaves the public at a loss to explain their work or their votes. As former Speaker
of the House James Wright, Democrat of Texas, remarked: “We are a hydra
headed monster compared to the president.” (Hess in Davidson and Olsezek, p.
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141) Former New York Times correspondent Hedrick Smith observed more
recently that, “In this simplified world, Congress is too brawling and diverse to
follow easily, because it deals openly with the complexity of issues, whereas the
White House deals with most complexities in private. The result is that
comparatively speaking, Congress is undercovered and the president over
covered. (Smith, p. 399) Mr. Smith went on to say that the Congress plays a
relatively minor role in what he calls “the running soap opera of politics,
[because] television needs a leading man, and the president fits the bill... .The
presidency becomes a TV serial; the president, his family, his aides and cohorts
become recognizable characters in the play.” (Smith, p. 400)
Representative Robert Michel, the House Republican leader from Illi
nois, took this line of thinking one step further at a recent National Press Club
speech:
Li the 1980s, the Great Communicator Ronald Reagan dominated the
medium [of television] as if Congress existed in some kind of communication
time warp bypassed by the electronic age in terms of quantity and quality of
coverage....Presidents have all those things that television loves—ceremony,
helicopters, pageantry, sound bites, falling balloons and most important, one
human being for the camera to concentrate on. Covering Congress is reporting
on a very complicated institutional process. It’s an acquired taste, like Scotch or
string quartets or maybe even Sam Donaldson....Television reporting on
Congress takes second place to reporting on the president.” (Michel on C-SPAN,
Dec. 7,1989)
While it is a given that members of Congress need the press, it is also a
given that reporters just as badly need members of Congress. As Roger H.
Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek write:
Reporters and their sources are locked in a love-hate embrace. Each has
what the other craves: sources have information on which reporters’ jobs
depend; reporters have the power to create publicity, the lifeblood of poltical
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careers. Whatever their private feelings, reporters sense that they cannot
disclose certain things if they want future interviews. Lawmakers know that
cultivating the press corps pays off in good publicity. (Davidson & Oleszek, p.
153)
It is clear, then, that the media is more than an omniscient and uninter
ested observer in the public policy process. Rather, the media is an interested and
human player in the political game and is of vital importance as a transmitter of
information from elected officials to their constituents. The ironic note in the
media’s rise to high stature is that its rise was not forseen by the men who
founded the 13 American colonies. The constitutional convention, which
convened in Philadelphia in 1787, met behind closed doors. Indeed, the
document they drafted contained no specific mention of granting guaranteed
freedoms of the press. (“Guide to Congress,” p. 738)
Indeed, in their first years of debate and work, neither the House nor the
Senate allowed journalists into their galleries to listen and report on the debates.
The House opened its galleries in 1790; the Senate followed four years later in
1794. (“Guide to Congress,” p. 738) In arguments to be repeated in the debates
on television coverage in the 1980s, the Senate came under fire from many for
its delay in opening its proceedings to the press and public. Opponents of
opening the Senate’s sessions believed “that opening the doors would promote
oratorical pyrotechnics for the benefit of the gallery and press and would
interfere with the expeditious performance of public business.” (Byrd, p. 27)
The National Gazette opined in 1792 that:
This patrician style, this concealment, this affection of pre-eminence but
illy accords with the spirit of republican government. The Constitution of the
United States acknowledges no superiority of one legislative body over another,
and to assume it is a violation of its principle, and an insult to the character of
freemen. It is a strange maxim in republican policy, that the agents of the people
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should keep their deliberations concealed from those from whom they derive
their political existence. (Swanstrom in Byrd, p. 9)
When the Senate did open its gallery to the media and the public on
December 7,1795, the move was heralded by a man who has been dubbed the
first congressional news correspondent. Samuel Harrison Smith, writing in
1802, said the Senate’s decision was “prelude to a more genuine sympathy
between the Senate and the people of the United States” and that supporters of
an open Senate were each to be regarded as a “friend of the true principles of our
republican institutions.” (Gorton, Congressional Record, July 29, 1986, p. S
9765)
Some lament the importance of the media. This group contends that
policymakers now know less about the substance of legislation and the reality
of governing and more about how to get their name on the evening news or in
the newspaper. As Representative Richard Bolling, Democrat of Missouri,
commented in his book “House Out of Order:”
“City-reared members, whose only view of a cow has been of a can of
condensed milk, can get their names quoted in the press as experts in agriculture.
A House member whose travel consists of a triangular course between West
Wetdrip, Washington and the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia can make the
news with outrageous comment about our foreign aid program simply by
getting a press handout to the gallery early in the morning. A member who can’t
keep his family accounts in balance can be quoted on the president’s economic
message to the Congress provided he looks at an advance copy and sends a
statement to the gallery first thing in the morning.” (Bolling in “Guide to
Congress,” p. 742)
While it is clear that members can effect how they are perceived by the
type of press operation they have and the attention they give to their media
image, it is also clear that the media exerts an equal force in determining what
the image, or what a specific policy, may turn out to be. “Through sensitive
media relations, members can readily influence news coverage of Congress. But
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the nation’s media in the process can change the way that senators and
representatives act, and indeed how the House and Senate function. At times,
moreover, the press can exert an enormous impact on what issues members
address and what Congress does about them.” (“Guide to Congress,” p. 744, col.
1) Historians have pointed out many times in our nation’s history, from the
entrance of the United States into the Spanish-American War to our changing
policies in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, where the press has exerted a
substantial influence on the outcome of a significant government policy.
Another facet of this relationship, as bome out in Representative Bolling’s
remark made in 1965, is the increasing use members of Congress are making of
the media. In an study compiled in 1981, Michael Robinson found some
interesting differences between the congressional classes of 1958 and 1978. The
class of 1978, he wrote, was three times as likely to depend on television to
campaign as theirpredecessors were. The study showed younger members were
more inclined to use the House recording studio to prepare shows or interviews
to be sent back home than was the class of 1958. Also, sixty percent of the class
of 1978 used media consultants in their election campaigns. More recently,
Timothy E. Cook found that the number of House members who designated one
of their staff as a press secretary shot up from 54 in 1970 to 243 in 1986. Mr.
Cook sees the increase of press secretaries on Capitol Hill as the result of a
heightened media consciousness among members as well as being “a reaction
at all levels to resources made generally available and to the presence of the
news media in the contemporary political world.” (Cook, p. 72-73)
Former Speaker Wright’s comment that Congress is a “hydra-headed
monster” has found believers in other fields as well. Writing in the Federal
Communications Bar Journal, Clark Puntigam argues that, aside from the
actual government powers either of the three branches of government possess,
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the ability to communicate effectively to the public is by itself a vital component
of a given branch’s power. He writes:
The dynamic power of each branch is more or less determined by its
ability to communicate directly with the electorate, so as to justify and gain the
confidence of their respective actions. According to this view, communication
itself is power, and exclusive access to the communication media is an
unchecked, unbalanced power. If one branch of the government is able to gain
nearly exclusive or at least effective access to any or all of the media, while the
other branches are more or less excluded, the balance of power will lean in the
direction of the branch with access. (Puntigam in Garay, p. 16)
Speaking on the same subject, but as one of the parties directly effected
by what was preceived to be a predominace of the airwaves by the executive
branch, Senator J.W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas and the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the height of the Vietnam War,
wrote:
Under our Constitution there is no paramount branch of the federal
government; if indeed the framers regarded any branch as primus inter pares,
it was not the executive but the Congress, whose powers are spelled out in the
Constitution at the greatest length and in greatest detail. If the president is
regarded as having the right to communicate with the people through the mass
media whenever he wishes, the spirit and intent of the Constitution requires that
no less privilege be accorded to the Senate and the House of Representatives—■
or if it should claim it—to the judiciary. (Senate Communications Subcommit
tee in Garay, p. 67)
Prior to taking a look at the legislative history of Congressional television
and radio, it is interesting to note Ronald Garay’s theory on the rise of television
access in Congress in the 1970s and 1980s. Garay believes, as does Puntigam,
that Congress’ efforts to improve its own accessibility to both its floor and
committee proceedings seemed to coincide with the Congressional desire to
“reestablish its policymaking initiative.” (Garay, p. 20) While there were
certainly other factors at work in Congress’ decisions to increase its access to
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the media, such as its desire to modernize and update archaic rules and
procedures, the underlying notion here is that access to the public meant
visibility and visibility in turn would mean enhancement of the branch’s role,
mission, and power.
While it may appear that Congress first began experimenting and
changing its policies toward media access in the 1970s, that assumption would
be deceiving and erroneous. Actually, as early as February 1922, when Represenative Vincent Brennan, Republican of Michigan, introduced H.J. Res. 270
which called for allowing complete radio coverage of both the House and Senate
floor proceedings, members of Congress have taken an interest in getting their
message out to the American people and opening up its doors to public scrutiny.
Representative Brennan was one of the early proponents of radio coverage and
his bill met the fate of a number of other similar bills in the 1920s—they were
referred to committees, never to make it out and back on the floor for serious
consideration.
The first minor ripple in the history of media access to Congress occured
in December 1932. Speaker of the House John Nance Gamer, Democrat of
Texas, at the time was steadfast in opposition to radio coverage of House
debates. There was particularly keen interest at the time in House debates in
December 1932 as members were debating the repeal of the 18th amendment
of the Constitution, which had banned the consumption of alcohol. Despite
Speaker Gamer’s opposition, some enterprising reporters from CBS and NBC
Radio circumvented the Speaker’s wishes. The reporters placed microphones in
a doorway area just off the House floor. The microphones picked up the debate
and the vote counts clearly and transmitted them to listeners. While there was
substantial audience interest in the debate, the event did not create the stir
backers of Congressional radio may have hoped for. Congressional leadership
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still did not give serious consideration to opening the way to radio coverage.
Ronald Garay notes that during the first half of the 20th century, most
members of Congress had little interest in adopting full scale radio coverage.
The reason was simple and politically beneficial for any incumbent member of
Congress: at this time most radio stations were exceedingly generous in
granting members of Congress uninterrupted and unedited time on the air.
Broadcasters provided the time for free and members of Congress made ample
use of the privilege, speaking unfiltered to their constituents. Even allowing
complete radio coverage on the floor could not equal the opportunity the radio
industry was regularly making available to members of Congress. (Garay, p. 29)
In 1944, a consistent voice in Congress for broadcast coverage drafted a
bill to provide radio coverage of the Senate. Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat
of Florida, introduced a bill that would have allowed radio coverage of the full
Senate as well as its committees. His bill, like a similar one he would introduce
in 1947 to allow television coverage, the first bill of its kind in either body, was
not reported out of committee.
Radio coverage was given more serious attention from March to June
1945. The occasion was the hearings of the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress, whose work would culminate in the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946. Chaired by Senator Robert LaFollette, Progressive of Wisconsin,
and Representative Mike Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma, the group de
voted a portion of its time to discussing the issue but it was not included in the
final measure passed into law.
By the late 1940s, the talk among supporters of direct radio coverage was
eclipsed by those wanting television coverage. In fact, television cameras were
allowed in the House of Representatives for the first time to record the opening
of the 80th Congress on January 3,1947. Broadcasting magazine described the
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major event of the day’s coverage in a news brief in the back of an issue: “Aside
from telephoto lens dropping from television camera to floor of House Friday,
first telecast of Congress went off as scheduled. No interruption, two cameras
used. Lens damaged. Nobody hurt.” (Broadcastings January 6,1947, p. 86) The
cameras would not get back inside the House chamber for thirty years.
During this time, congressional committees were slowly beginning to
allow television cameras into the hearing rooms of Capitol Hill. On March 30
and April 2,1948, the Senate Armed Services Committee allowed cameras into
its proceedings as it considered the country’s need for universal military
training. In August 1948, the House Un-American Activities Committee opened
its hearings, on communist infiltration of the government, to the media. The
hearings lasted 21 days and included historic exchanges and charges between
Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers. From 1948 to 1951, five other committees
allowed broadcast of their deliberations.
One of the watershed marks of Congressional television came from
January to March, 1951. The Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organ
ized Crime in Interstate Commerce, known more commonly as the Kefauver
Hearings after their chairman Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee,
held hearings in 14 American cities, of which seven were covered in whole or
in part by television crews. The hearings helped foster Senator Kefauver’s 1952
campaign for president, according to some sources. (Doig, p. 484) This despite
the fact that the committee’s chairman may have been “as gawky a Tennessean
as ever ambled down the Senate aisles.” (Doig, p. 483) Although the hearings
won an Emmy award (for “bringing the working...of government into the
homes of the American people”), the hearings simultaneously raised serious
issues associated with television as a medium covering a deliberative, public
policy event. (Garay, p. 38) Many of the arguments presented in the aftermath
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of the Kefauver hearings would be recurring ones, appearing when both the
House and Senate considered opening their doors to television.
During the Kefauver Hearings, witnesses were cited for contempt for
failing to answer questions put to them by committee members. The witnesses
claimed that testifying before an open committee meeting, being watched by
potentially millions of viewers, infringed on their constitutional right to have a
fair and impartial hearing. The Senate voted to uphold the convictions of
contempt on the uncooperative witnesses after considerable debate. A federal
court later overturned the convictions in October 1952 ruling that the witnesses
were fully within their rights in not testifying and were wholly justified in not
responding to questions from the committee members. As journalist Douglas
Cater wrote later, even the committee’s chairman had mixed feelings about
some of the panel’s action:
In retrospect, Kefauver too has expressed misgivings about certain
aspects of the hearings. He has said that he was mistaken in ordering a gambler
to testify before the television cameras. Late in 1954, Kefauver sent a letter to
Lyndon Johnson of Texas, soon to become Senate Majority Leader of the
Eighty-Fourth Congress, in which he showed a keen realization that investiga
tive procedures had gone astray. ‘I have been aghast.. .at the excesses to which
the various committees of Congress have gone in the fields of the so-called
subversive investigations,’ he wrote. ‘They have made us all look ridiculous by
their headline grabbing tactics.’ (Cater, “Estes Kefauver...,” in Doig, p. 490)
There was considerable debate within Congress after the Kefauver
Hearings about continued television coverage of congressional committee
hearings. Opponents of televison coverage argued that the mere presence of
television cameras led to posturing by Senators and created an atmosphere that
was not conducive to a calm and deliberative examination of fact and opinion.
These opponents felt there was little sense in exposing witnesses to the public,
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that coverage encouraged unbecoming behavior by members, that the due
process of witnesses was unconstitutionally infringed upon, and further that
there is no constitutionally recognized right for the public to know or see
everything that goes on in its government. Backers of continued coverage
countered that the public does have a right to know about the workings of its
government, that the public should have the right to view a government event
by television if they would be allowed access to walk unimpeded into a
Congressional hearing room, and further that the public should be encouraged
to use news coverage from the mass media to measure the effectiveness and the
performance of their legislators.
Three years after the Kefauver Hearings, Senator Joseph McCarthy,
Democrat of Wisconsin, held hearings which began April 22,1954, examining
communist infiltration in the American military. All three commercial networks
covered at least portions of the hearings, with ABC covering them gavel to
gavel. After these hearings, which frequently featured Senator McCarthy
badgering witnesses, many thought unfairly, there were renewed calls in
Congress to promulgate a standard of fair practice for conducting committee
hearings.
On the House side during the 1940s to the 1960s, there is little to give
background on for two fundamental reasons: Speakers Sam Raybum, Democrat
of Texas, and John McCormack, Democrat of Massachusetts. Both speakers
unilaterally decided there would be no television cameras in a House committee
hearing room or on the House floor so long as they had power to stop it. This
policy would not change until the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1970, of which section 116 allowed television and radio coverage of House
committee hearings if the hearing was open to the public and is in keeping with
the specific rules each individual committee adopts.
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The next significant event in television’s relationship to Congress, and
many argue the most important, was the televising of the proceedings of the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. More com
monly known as the Watergate Committee, the broadcast networks devised
their own rotation for covering the committee’s deliberations and devoted 319
hours of coverage to the ongoing investigation of the Nixon administration and
its campaign activities. Following the deliberations of Watergate committee, the
networks aired in total the impeachment proceedings undertaken by the House
Judiciary Committee. The coverage was watched by some 70 million people
according to unofficial estimates—a figure that was almost double the popula
tion of the United States in 1868 when President Andrew Johnson became the
first president to be impeached. {Broadcasting, August 5,1974, p. 16) In its final
report, the committee let its reasoning on why they let the cameras in to the
hearing room be known:
The Committees’ interest in televising hearings was not to obtain
publicity for publicity’s sake. The facts which the committee produced dealt
with the very integrity of the electoral process; they were the facts, the
committee believed, the public had a right to know. Most citizens are not able
personally to attend the working sessions of the Government. Although thou
sands of people spent short periods in the Caucus room during the hearings,
these visitors represented only a small percentage of the electorate. Thus, it was
desirable that every citizen be able to view the hearings, if not in the caucus
rooms, then in his home or place of business. The ability to read about the
hearings could only be achieved by observing the witnesses and hearing the
testimony.” (Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities in
Garay, p. 74)
In 1974, the Senate’s examination of televising their floor proceedings
grew a bit more intense. Under the chairmanship of Senator Lee Metcalf,
Democrat of Montana, the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations began
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to scrutinize some possibilities for coverage. Senator Metcalf’s hearings, and
his introduction of S.Res. 447 to allow cameras in the Senate chamber, laid the
groundwork for what was to come, although that resolution, and a subsequent
one he introduced in 1975, were given little consideration. (Garay, p. 83)
Meanwhile, on December 19,1974, cameras were permitted in the Senate on a
one-time basis only—to cover the swearing-in of President Gerald Ford’s new
vice president, Nelson Rockefeller.
On the House side in the 1970s, with the passing of the domineering
leadership styles of John McCormack and Sam Rayburn, many members were
actively pursuing plans for House television. In January 1975, Representative
John Anderson, Republican of Illinois, introduced H.Res. 110, a bill to conduct
a test of audio and visual coverage of House proceedings. His proposal, like
those of Representatives Jack Brooks and B.F. Sisk, which called for closed
circuit coverage and network coverage of floor activity, met a similar fate—they
did not reach the House floor for consideration.
While there was considerable internal discussion both on the House
Rules Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee on Broadcasting, chaired by
Representative Sisk, new Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill unilaterally and
unexpectedly announced that beginning March 15,1977, there would be a 90day live test of House television coverage. The pictures of the House, would be
available only in the Rayburn room, directly off the House floor, and in the
Rayburn office building, one of the three major House offices on Capitol Hill.
Speaker O ’Neill said his office would control the experiment “to assure that any
disturbance to the nature and character of the House proceedings would be
minimized.” (Garay, p. 97)
The experiment began on schedule March 15 with one observer in the
Rayburn building noting that watching “certainly beat monitoring the lobby of
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a retirement hotel after midnight.. .but not by much.” (Garay, p. 98) In the last
days of the experiment, the Select Committee on Congressional Operations,
which was helping the Speaker carry out the test, sent out 150 questionnaires to
members soliciting their views. Few members saw any adverse effects to
making coverage permanent and readily accessible to the public. The Select
Committee later authored a report, at the completion of the television experi
ment, stating that “neither technical nor policy considerations stand in the way
of a permanent [House broadcasting] system.” (Garay, p. 100)
On October 6,1977, Representative Gillis Long, Democrat of Louisiana,
took recommendations from the committee and crafted a bill, H.Res. 821, to
allow complete television coverage of House floor proceedings. The House
Rules Committee acted quickly and held two days of hearings on the Long bill,
adding a provision requiring the House Rules Committee to conduct a study of
the questions involving control of the television system. With that provision, the
bill now known as H.Res. 866, moved to the floor October 27. The House passed
the bill with little debate by a vote of 342-44 thereby granting the speaker the
power to continue to expand the closed circuit television system.
In February 1978, the House Rules Committee conducted the hearings on
the control of the television system that would relay pictures of House floor
activity. While there were several options under consideration, only two
proposals received serious attention and debate. Led by Representatives Ander
son and Sisk were those seeking a network pool arrangement for House
television coverage. Their desire to have an outside, independent source in their
view was indispensable. As Representative Sisk wrote in the New York Times:
“If the broadcasts appear censored or in any way restricted, the validity of the
coverage will be questioned. Rather than enhancing the House credibility,
broadcasts that are considered self-serving could tamish its image.” (Garay, p.
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The other proposal under serious consideration was to have a House
television system controlled by the Speaker of the House or by a special House
committee. The House Rules Committee adopted this approach in June 1978,
by a vote of 9-6. After addressing itself to the drawbacks of the two approaches,
the majority report concluded:
We see no violation of first amendment rights if the House operates the
broadcast coverage. On the contrary, the House will not impose on all broadcast
journalists the unchangeable judgment of only one of their colleagues [as would
be the case with a single television director]. Fears of censorship are completely
warranted. The House has committed itself to providing complete and unedited
access to its proceedings, unedited by the House or by any other hand.... It is
because of this deeply imbedded news and drama oriented predilection of the
broadcast media—perfectly understandable and commendable for their legiti
mate purpose but inappropriate for what we see as the fundamental purpose of
the coverage—that we reject network pool control and recommend House
operation of the system. (Garay, p. 106-7)
The judgment of the House Rules Committee was endorsed by the full
House June 14. The vote was 235 to 150. After nine months of preparation, the
House went on the airwaves and was available gavel-to-gavel to roughly 3.5
million cable households through the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network,
more commonly known as C-SPAN. Then-Representative Albert Gore Jr.,
Democrat of Tennesee, made the first statement from the floor. “Television will
change this institution, just as it has changed the executive branch, but the good
will outweigh the bad. From this day forward every member of this body must
ask himself or herself how many Americans are listening to the debates which
are made.” (Garay, p. 115-16)
Despite Representative Gore's words, the first day of House television
was greeted in some quarters by humorous cynicism. PBS correspondent Paul
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Duke said, “They started off with a good typical day. It was uninspiring and
dull.” (Perry, p. 16). The chief counsel of one House committee told the same
reporter, “Look at them, all dressed up in their three-piece suits. It looks like a
giant ad for Brook Brothers. If it goes anywhere, it’s the end of civilization as
we have known it.” (Perry, p. 16)
Whether it was the end of civilization or not, many senators on the south
side of Capitol Hill would be watching House television with a close eye.

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF SENATE TELEVISION: 1979-1986
As chapter one showed, the House did not rush to its decision to allow
television coverage of its floor proceedings. Proponents of Senate television
were keeping a watchful eye on House TV’s early months. In fact, shortly after
March 19,1979, the day of the House television debut, Senator Robert Byrd, the
Senate majority leader and Democrat of West Virginia, said he would be
watching progress in the House to measure how the Senate should best proceed
with its own television coverage, if it were to proceed at all. (Garay, p. 118)
Although the first day of House television has been called historic, there
was another event which took place two years earlier in the Senate that was
arguably of equal import. Before the Senate began floor deliberations on the
newly proposed Panama Canal Treaty, a controversial arrangement which
called on the United States to eventually relinquish control of the canal, Senator
Byrd introduced S.Res. 268 to allow radio and television coverage of Senate
floor proceedings, limited to the debate about the treaty. Senator Byrd said that
in exercising its advice and consent role as mandated by the Constitution, the
Senate needed an informed citizenry to ensure that the collective wisdom be
used to make a decision on the treaty. (Garay, p. 95)
Senator Byrd’s bill was assigned to the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration. After studying the bill, and working with lighting and technical
consultants to consider the many problems associated with lighting the Senate
chamber, the committee removed all references in the proposal to television
coverage, leaving intact its plan to allow for live radio coverage of floor debate.
The bill was reported to the full Senate February 2,1978, and quickly passed,
19
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less than a week before the treaty debate was scheduled to begin.
The Senate began debate on the treaty February 8 with CBS and NBC
radio carrying brief excerpts of the debate, while National Public Radio carried
the floor proceedings in their entirety, with only slight interruptions for its
reporter, congressional correspondent Linda Wertheimer, to identify speakers
and provide background information on the proceedings. National Public
Radio’s gavel-to-gavel coverage won widespread acclaim and fared better in the
ratings than the network’s normal daytime programming. In what would turn
out to be prophetic commentary, to be seen in later evaluations of congressional
television, on National Public Radio’s coverage, the Washington Post opined
that, “Far from encouraging showboating the microphones seemed to concen
trate senatorial minds and create conditions conducive to a spirited exchange of
opposing views.” (Garay, p. 96) Years later, speaking at a forum examining the
first ten years of congressional television, Senator Byrd remarked that having
television coverage of the treaty debate would have helped his side make its
case. “I wish we had television in the Senate when I brought up the Panama
Canal Treaty,” he said. “I think the people of this country would have understood
the issues better and would have understood better than they did in the face of
all the propaganda that went out against those treaties...” (Byrd, “Ten Years of
Televising Congress”)
Despite the generally acknowledged success of National Public Radio’s
coverage of the Panama Canal debate, pushing a bill through the Senate
allowing for complete television coverage of floor proceedings remained, at
best, an open proposition. Except for one brief effort by then-Senate Minority
Leader Howard Baker, Republican of Tennessee, to allow one-time only basis
coverage of the SALT II treaty debate, little formal consideration of Senate
television’s possibilities took place until 1981.
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On January 6, 1981, Senator Baker, who had just become the Senate’s
majority leader, introduced S.Res. 20 that would have allowed for continuous
live coverage of Senate floor proceedings. Senator Baker made no secret of the
fact that he considered bringing television coverage to the Senate one of his top
legislative priorities. While many senators publicly acknowledged an openness
to the idea of television [an informal poll conducted by C-SPAN at the time
showed 19 senators against or leaning against; 57 senators in favor or leaning
in favor of the bill; while 23 senators were undecided], there were powerful and
savvy foes lined up against allowing any form of Senate television coverage.
(Garay, p. 119) Chief among them was Senator Russell Long, Democrat of
Louisiana and longtime chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee.
(Garay, p. 119)
Senator Baker’s bill was referred to the Senate Rules Committee, which
held three days of hearings on the proposal in April 1981. When Senator Baker
testified before the panel, chaired by Senator Charles Mathias, Republican of
Maryland, he stressed the importance of TV coverage in breaking the cocoon
atmosphere that pervades Washington, that coverage would allow citizens to see
their elected representatives at work, and would begin to redress the imbalance
of power between the Senate and the more exposed and visible executive
branch. (Garay, p. 120) As for other technical concerns, Senator Baker said,
“There are no insurmountable lighting, temperature, camera location, or edito
rial control problems [with Senate television]... The most difficult issue is more
of a philosophical nature; that is, can the Senate effectively serve its deliberative
role with the people watching our every move?” (Garay, p. 119) The primary
voice of opposition to Senator Baker’s bill was, not surprisingly, Senator Long.
Senator Long said the mere presence of cameras would effectively stifle
meaningful dialogue between senators on the floor. Instead, he said, senators
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would tailor their remarks to constituents watching on television at home, rather
than to the issue at hand on the Senate floor. “The greatest surplus commodity
we have in the Congress are speeches that need never be made,” Senator Long
said. “Speeches that fail to improve on silence.” (Garay, p. 120)
On July 8,1981, the Rules Committee reported S.Res. 20 to the Senate
floor, only to have the bill sit for six months while Senator Baker waited for the
opportune moment to bring the bill up for debate on the Senate floor. When he
brought the bill to the floor in February 1982, Senator Baker jokingly realized
that there may never be an opportune moment to easliy pass a bill allowing
television coverage—he pointed to an inordinately large number of cough drops
in Senator Long’s Senate desk, hinting that the opposition may filibuster to
prevent the bill’s passage. “I must confess...that I observed surreptiously the
deposit of three rolls of cough drops in the desk drawer of the distinguished
Senator from Louisiana, which may be a bad sign, at least for me.” (Baker,
Congressional Record, February 2,1982, p. S 269) The Senate considered the
television bill from February 2-4, 1982, as the arguments which had hitherto
been made only in Senate committee rooms at last worked their way onto the
Senate floor. Senator Baker, the champion of S.Res. 20, recalled the story often
told about humorist Will Rogers, as he spoke on behalf of the resolution:
The story goes, that Rogers went home after a few months in Washington
and was walking down the street of his hometown and someone said, ‘Will, is
it true that Congress is made up of theives and rascals?’ He said, ‘Yes, but it is
a good cross section of its constituency. Mr. President, Congress is not made up
of theives and rascals but we are a good cross section of our constituency. We
are indeed a microcosm of America. Sometimes our arguments are better than
they are at other times. But there is no point in us cleaning up our act. We are
what we are. And we are a good cross section of America and because of that,
America is entitled to watch and to know what we are doing. (Baker, Congres
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sional Record, February 4,1982, p. S 347)
Along with Senate veterans like Senators Russell Long of Louisiana and
John Stennis, a Democrat from Mississippi, Senator John Danforth, a Repub
lican of Missouri, stepped up to oppose S.Res. 20. In the first day of debate
February 2, Senator Danforth said he was concerned that the presence of
television cameras would change the nature of the discourse in the Senate,
because, he said, “the nature of conversation before a television camera for a
person who wants to be on the television camera is different from the nature of
conversation and discussion when the television camera is not going.” (Dan
forth, Congressional Record, February 2,1982, p. S 270) Senator Danforth, as
other foes of S.Res. 20 did, focused his comments on his vision of what the
Senate should represent in the American scheme of democracy:
It is my concern that we in the Senate are so overloaded in our time
scheduling and so pulled apart by sundry demands that are made on us that we
tend to be given to too little consideration in debate on major policy questions
and too much effort either to respond to the immediate issues before us or to
figure out some unique way of presenting ourselves to our constituents or to the
country.
I am concerned that the televising of debate in the Senate would
exacerbate that problem, and it would make us less inclined to be deliberative
and thoughtful and more inclined to be unique, different, and given to brief
spurts of the colorful rhetoric which would maximize our opportunity to make
the evening news. (Danforth, Congressional Record, February 2, 1982, p. S
272)
Senator Baker and his allies, chief among them was Senator Mathias, the
Rules Committee chairman from Maryland, sought to dispel the notion, as
Senator Mathias said, that United States senators are merely “100 moths
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fascinated by the candle of television.” (Mathias, Congressional Record,
February 2, 1982, p. S 271) Senator Baker projected that, if anything, the
presence of cameras would curtail lengthy speechmaking and pontificating,
rather than act as an incentive to such behavior. “If there is any effect, ” Senator
Baker said, “it is more likely to be the effect of shortening those speeches and
rendering the debate a little more crisp and the prose a little more legible... because
I think public scrutiny will require it.” (Baker, Congressional Record, February
2,1982, p. S 272)
Some senators who opposed the resolution pointed out the differences in
the constitutional responsibilities the Founding Fathers assigned to the House
and Senate, implying that the Senate need not feel compelled to follow the
House into the television age. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Democrat of
New York, pointed out that “it is not a constitutional precedent that, the House
of Representatives having adopted television coverage, the same ought to apply
to this body....We are here to give second thought to the judgments of the
popular body at the other end of the Capitol. It is our role to be deliberative more
than to be representative.” (Moynihan, Congressional Record, February 2,
1982, p. S 274]
Along with expressing fear about the implications gavel-to-gavel televi
sion coverage would have on the workings of the Senate as an institution, at least
one senator, again Senator Long, feared that the politically ambitious seeking
to run for president would use the Senate floor as a bully pulpit from which to
stage a presidential campaign. “Do we want to spend [the taxpayers’] millions
over a six-year period providing a single senator that type of multimillion dollar
platform from which to advance his race for president of the United States?,”
Senator Long wondered. (Long, Congressional Record, February 3,1982, p. S
344)
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Later in the debate that same day, Senator Baker, himself an unsuccessful
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980, sought to allay
Senator Long’s fears about senators using the Senate floor as a soapbox from
which to run for president. “Running for president from the floor of the Senate
is a remarkably unrewarding experience,” Senator Baker said. “While it is also
true that the Senate is the cradle of presidential candidates and presidents, I do
not think that is any significant problem....Maybe televising the Senate will
give everyone a chance. It might be nice. At least you would not be cut and end
up on the editor’s floor if it was live and gavel-to-gavel on the cable.” (Baker,
Congressional Record, February 3,1982, p. S 348)
Following the three days of debate on the resolution, Senator Baker
withdrew the bill from the floor, hoping to rekindle interest in it at some point
in the spring. On April 20, the Senate was back to the issue when Senator Baker
sought to invoke cloture, thus choking off further debate and blocking the
anticipated filibuster by Senator Long and his allies. The motion to invoke
cloture failed by 13 votes and fell even four votes shy of the simple majority
necessary for passage. The vote was 47 to 51. The next day, Senator Baker
offered an amendment co-sponsored by Senator Byrd which gave the Senate
Rules Committee 60 days to draft a plan for televison coverage of the Senate.
The committee was asked to consider questions which S.Res. 20 had left open;
including the probable cost of Senate television, control of the cameras, and the
type of coverage to be provided (gavel-to-gavel or some other form). By
introducing this amendment, Senator Baker said he wanted to address one of the
principal concerns many senators addressed during floor debate: that excessive
authority had been given away to the Rules Committee to devise the schemes
of coverage without providing review of those decisions by the full Senate.
(Baker, Congressional Record, April 21, 1982, p. S 3798] The amendment
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passed overwhelmingly, 95 to 1.
On July 27,1982, after two extensions of its deadline to complete the new
report, the Rules Committee reported its findings and reached the same
conclusion it had previously—for the Senate to allow television coverage in a
similar format as the House was currently using. The committee did not
recommend any rules changes; called for gavel-to-gavel coverage of Senate
proceedings; called for an appropriation of $3.5 million so the Senate could
operate its six cameras and control studio; accredited news organizations would
be allowed to plug into the Senate feed for news purposes only (the video could
not be used for commerecial or political reasons). Despite the report, Senator
Baker decided not to pursue the measure further as the 97th Congress wound
down in December 1982.
A few years later, in a television interview on the eve of Senate television
in 1986, former Senator Baker spoke of the problems he encountered trying
make Senate television a reality:
It started out as a mistmst in the Senate of an unknown element. It was
perhaps more pronounced in the Senate than in the House, because the Senate
is a smaller body. There is a more collegial atmosphere in the Senate. It’s a
smaller group, and more tight-knit. And it may be that the relative seniority of
the Senate was a big bug-a-boo. For instance, [Senator] Russell Long had been
there a long time, and [Senator] John Stennis... They had a grave mistmst of
anything that would alter the way the Senate had functioned—as they knew it—
over their combined experience.” (Baker, C-SPAN Interview)
In the 98th Congress, Senator Mathias introduced a resolution calling for
Senate television. When he introduced S.Res. 66, a bill similar to Senator
Baker’s S.Res. 20, Senator Mathias said: “As we all know, innovation does not
come quickly to the Congress, especially to this body. We need not worry that
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we are rushing into this matter with undue haste. The idea has been with us in
one form or another since the mid-1940s... Surely we cannot be accused of the
type of haste that makes waste.” (Garay, p. 129)
On June 15, S. Res. 66 was reported out of Senator Mathias’ Committee
on Rules and Administration. The bill languished, remaining untouched until
the fall of 1984, when in the rush to close the 98th Congress, Senator Baker
brought the bill to the Senate floor for consideration. Senator Baker, who has
earlier in the year announced his impending retirement from the Senate, called
the Senate televsion resoultion “one I count among the most important of my
Senate service.” (Baker, Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S
11222) Senator Baker, who recognized that was his last chance to work on
behalf of Senate television in his career, made several impassioned pleas over
the course of the Senate’s four days of debate on the bill:
Presidents, of course, have long recognized the value of televison as an
instrument of education and persuasion, and their domination of the airwaves
is crucial to their domination of public policy debate... .The Senate by contrast
remains cloaked in mystery....We stand in danger of surrendering our special
place in American government by technological default at the very time when
the American people’s interest in public affairs is at its peak. (Baker, Congres
sional Record, September 17,1984, p. S 11223)
Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican of Pennsylvania, echoed the views
held by many senators when he said the untelevised Senate was becoming an
increasingly irrelevant body when compared to the televised House of Repre
sentatives. Senator Specter recounted the recent visit of a friend, who brought
her 10-year-old son along on a trip to Washington. The child told Senator
Specter he wanted to meet Speaker of the House “Tip” O ’Neill, a Massachusetts
Democrat. When Senator Specter asked why he wanted to meet Speaker O ’Neill
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rather than Senator Majority Leader Baker, the boy said, “Because I see O’Neill
on television all the time.” (Specter, Congressional Record, September 17,
1984,p .S 11225)
Battling these arguments was another consistent foe of Senate television,
Senator Wendell Ford, a Democrat of Kentucky and ranking Democrat on the
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Echoing arguments made by
Senator Moynihan in the 1982 debates, Senator Ford said, “Unlike the House
of Represenatives, the Senate was conceived by the Founding Fathers as a
cooling-off body, a slower, deliberative body, more insulated from the vacillat
ing pressures of public opinion. Television in the chamber would destroy that
insulation and that fundamental concept of our Founding Fathers.” (Ford,
Congressional Record, September 17, 1984, p. S 11224)
Along with the now familiar arguments that television coverage would
distort the Senate’s constitutionally mandated function of being the more
deliberative of the two national legislatures, Senator William Proxmire, a
Democrat of Wisconsin, predicted that television would not do justice to the
Senate’s complexities and arcane mles:
My feeling is that televising the Senate will make it harder for senators
to reach...compromises. Senators will find that the position they took in their
opening statements have been engraved in film. Any compromising can easily
be portrayed as a loss and the senator who does it as a loser. If this scenario comes
to pass, the Senate may well grind to a halt. Senators are not by nature shrinking
violets, and additional incentives to confrontation can only mean more argu
ment—and probably worse legislation. (Proxmire, Congressional Record,
September 18,1984, p. S 11397)
As debate on S.Res. 66 came near an end, some senators complained that
considering Senate television during the close of a Congress, when many other
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pressing matters cried out for floor action, was inappropriate. Still others, like
Senator Lawton Chiles, a Democrat of Florida, said the Senate should consider
other types of coverage which were not included in the language of S.Res. 66.
Senator Chiles suggested that the Senate provide coverage of itself only when
it was considering “significant legislation,” adding that he questioned “whether
gavel-to-gavel coverage will represent a real contribution to the edification of
the public.” (Chiles, Congressional Record, September 17,1984, p. S 11640)
On Friday, September 21,1984, Senator Baker’s four-year crusade for
Senate television came to its end. A motion to close debate on S.Res. 66 was
defeated 37-44, effectively defeating any hopes for the bill’s passage in the 98th
Congress. “It is clear to me that this is an idea whose time has not come,” Senator
Baker said after the vote. “I regret, but I face reality when I find it. I will make
no further effort to pursue this matter in this session.” (Baker, Congressional
Record, September 21,1984, p. S 11675)
Among the many postmortems for the defeat of S.Res. 66, some pointed
to developments in House television in 1984 as contributing to the Senate’s
unwillingness to allow cameras in its chamber at that time. By 1984, gavel-togavel coverage of the House, as provided by the National Cable Satellite
Corporation, commonly known as C-SPAN, was available in approximately 17
million homes. Representative Newt Gingrich, Republican of Georgia, esti
mated that about 200,000 viewers watch House floor action at any given time.
“That’s not a bad crowd,” Representative Gingrich said. “This is the beginning
of the ability to have a nationwide town hall meeting.” (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1984, “Televised Partisan Skirmishes Erupt in House,” p. 206)
Throughout the first months of 1984, Representative Gingrich and other
members of his Conservative Opportunity Society took special orders time at
the end of legislative days, a time reserved where members may talk on any
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subject for as long as an hour. Gingrich’s band of conservatives used these
speeches as an occasion to advance their own political philosophy while at the
same time attacking Democrats’ stands on volatile issues like abortion and
school prayer. On May 8,1984, Representatives Gingrich and Robert Walker,
a Republican of Pennsylvania, used their special order time to attack the foreign
policy views of some 50 House Democrats by name, accusing them of backing
failed foreign policies fromthe Vietnam War to Central America. (Smith, p. 143)
Without any hint of what might be coming, Speaker O’Neill retaliated two days
later, ordering the House cameras, which he controlled, to pan the chamber
when Representative Walker was delivering a special order speech. This
marked the first time the cameras had panned the chamber; the cameras
normally focus solely on the recognized member speaking, not straying unless
another member is recognized by the chair.
On May 15, O’Neill and Gingrich met on the House floor where,
according to Congressional Quarterly, “all vestiges of congressional comity
disappeared.” [Congressional Almanac 1984, “Televised Partisan Skirmishes
Erupt in House,” p. 207] Speaker O’Neill, with his finger pointing at Gingrich
said, “My personal opinion is this: you deliberately stood in that well before an
empty House and challenged those people, and you challenged their American
ism, and it’s the lowest thing I’ve seen in my thirty-two years in the House.”
(Smith, p. 143) Because the Speaker’s words violated House rules which
forbade personal insults of House members, he was reprimanded by his fellow
Democrat presiding in the speaker’s chair, Representative Joe Moakley of
Massachusetts. Representative Robert Michel, the Republican minority leader
from Illinois, later said that the incident typified a mixture of two highly volatile
ingredients: partisanship and television. Of this incident, Michel said, “a match
was put to the mixture.” (Omstein, p. 6) New York Times correspondent Hedrick
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Smith observed that “by his cool, calculating style o f video politics, Gingrich
had gotten the better of the speaker and also won a national audience. Brash
video politics had put Gingrich on the political map.” (Smith, p. 143)
While brash video politics may have put Representative Gingrich on the
political map, they also may have destroyed any hope of getting the Senate on
television in 1984. Following the so called “CamScam” incident between
O ’Neill and Gingrich in the House, one Senate leadership aide said, “The House
having to hang its laundry in public is going to have a chilling effect with the
[Senate’s] members.” (“Televised Partisan Skirmishes Erupt in House,” p. 207)
Also, an aide to Senator Russell Long said the uproar in the House magnified
to Long the danger inherent in going on television and stiffened his opposition
to the idea.
At the beginning of the 99th Congress in January 1985, Senator Howard
Baker’s role as the lead mover of Senate television legislation was taken up by
a one-time opponent of the idea: Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd. The
Senate’s new majority leader, Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, did not stake out
a strongly held view on televising Senate proceedings. “I’ve never had any
strong feelings either way. I worry about what will happen,” Dole said. (Dole,
Los Angeles Times news meeting) Reflecting later why Senate televison did not
pass during his four years as majority leader, Senator Baker said it may have
been because his leadership position, rather than being a strength, was a
weakness. Senator Baker said that Senate television opponents would threaten
to filibuster if and when he brought up a television measure, putting Baker, as
the majority leader and schedule maker, the one person in the body responsible
to keep the Senate operating efficiently, in an awkward position. “I thought that
becoming majority leader would help my chances of bringing TV before the
Senate, but as a matter of fact, it didn’t.” (Sayenga, p. 11)
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Senator Byrd introduced S.Res. 28 in January 1985, a bill similar to its
two predecessors, S. Res. 20 and S.Res. 68. The bill was sent the same route the
others went, to the Senate’s Committee on Rules and Administration, which
reported the bill out by an 8 to 1 vote on October 29,1985. The committee’s bill
originally contained many rules changes, that were to be coupled with consid
eration of Senate television. Senator Byrd’s streamlining measures included
instituting electronic voting rather than continuing with the time-consuming
roll call method; placing stricter limits on hours of debate and filibuster; limiting
the use and frequency of quorum calls; and using a rule for germaneness similar
to the one used in the House. When opposition arose among some on the
committee, Senator Byrd abandoned his proposals, prefering to insure the
committee passage of the television measure without delay. The committee filed
its report Nov. 19 and Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Republican of
Kansas, said Senate television would be among the first matters the full Senate
would consider in 1986.
When S.Res. 28 reached the Senate floor on February 3, it was largely the
same bill as its predecessors in 97th and 98th Congress, save one distinction.
This resolution called for a two-step process to gain final passage. The first vote
would allow a six-week test period, slated to begin no later than May 1,1986.
Radio coverage could begin immediately, however, television coverage would
be limited to transmittal to Senate offices. After June 1, and for a period not to
go beyond July 15, Senate television coverage could be picked up by any
accredited news organization. After July 15, then, the Senate would have to vote
again if it wished to approve permanent television coverage, or if it wanted to
extend the test period another 30 days before taking a final vote on allowing
permanent coverage.
As debate on S.Res. 28 began February 3, many of Senate television’s
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longtime antagonists and protagonists trooped to the Senate floor making many
arguments with which the reader is now most familiar. “This videotape will
provide for all time the complete historical record of what occurs on the floor,”
Senator Mathias said. “It will preserve the voices, the facial expressions, the
triumph and the pain of senators who are engaged in debate.” (Mathias,
Congressional Record, February 3,1986, p. S 819) Senator Albert Gore Jr., the
first member to speak on House television, won the Senate seat Senator Howard
Baker retired from and became a strong proponent of Senate television. Picking
up on Senator Baker’s argument that the presence of television would electroni
cally extend the Senate gallery across the nation, Senator Gore said that the 611
seats in the gallery would have to change hands a thousand times a day for a year
for all American citizens to get a glimpse of their senators at work. (Gore,
Congressional Record, February 3,1986, p. S 823) Senator Gore also picked up
where Senator Baker left off in his arguments concerning the effects television
would have on the quality of debate. “For those opponents of Senate television
who fear a wave of long and self-indulgent speeches, the House experience
seems to indicate the opposite result. Speeches seem to have become more
focused and more carefully drafted. Words are chosen with more deliberation
and enunciated more precisely. Television, in other words, has helped to keep
members on their toes.” (Gore, Congressional Record, February 3,1986, p. S
824)
Senator John Melcher, Democrat of Montana, spoke again about the
“right” citizens have to watch their Senate at work. “Their opportunity to watch
and hear us as the Senate’s actions occur is a right, and I believe they want to
exercise that right,” Senator Melcher said. “The people will observe our
deliberations, observe and audit our actions, and they will tell us...how they
feel.... That review by the people themselves will be in a sense a report card to
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the Senate that will help to formulate government.” (Melcher, Congressional
Record, p. S 826, February 3,1986)
As the Senate began its debate on S.Res. 28, a mood of acceptance of
television’s inevitability seemed to permeate the chamber, with more senators
focusing their remarks on possible rule changes needed when television came
to the Senate, rather than debating the goodness or badness of the idea. By the
end of the first day of debate February 3,18 senators had made remarks about
the resolution, with only two senators, Senator Long and J. Bennett Johnston,
opposing it.
Senator Johnston was concerned, as were his comrades Senators Long
and Danforth, about the effect cameras would have on members ’behavior in the
chamber. He feared that the Senate would possibly abandon its traditional role
as “the saucer where the political passions of the nation are cooled.” (Schacter,
p. 507):
The real question, Mr. President, is to what extent and in what way would
television in this chamber change the U.S. Senate and are those changes for the
better? Those who say that it would not change the U.S. Senate, I believe, if there
are any who make that argument, are blind both to human nature and to the
political process and certainly to the realities of politics in the 1980s...
The first rule of politics is, ‘Get Re-elected; ’ and I guess that is the second
and third rule, too. In order to get re-elected, you have to get on television. I fear
that television in the Senate would mean that instead of being legislators, we
would try to be TV stars. (Johnston, Congressional Record, February 4,1986,
p. S 928 & S 936)
Arguing along the same line, Senator John Danforth wondered what the
result would be if the cameras used for Senate television would have to focus
on the presiding officer during lengthy quomm calls. “A lot of people are going
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to want to be presiding officers,” Senator Danforth said. “What better way for
a politician than to have your face on television for one solid hour and not make
a decision or cast a vote... .It is in the nature of politicians to alter their behavior
in order to be on television and in order to maximize the possibility that their
presence on television will make an impact.” (Danforth, Congressional Record,
February 5,1986, p. S 1021-22)
Despite the hardcore opposition to S.Res. 28, it was apparent that many
senators who in previous debates expressed misgivings about the idea now felt
the Senate should proceed to consider the resolution because there were other
tangible benefits. Among this group was Senator Lloyd Bentsen, Democrat of
Texas: “I do not think we should squander this opportunity on the part of the
Senate to use some leverage here in getting a change of the rules.” (Bentsen,
Congressional Record, February 5,1986, p. S 1023)
As debate continued in February, increased attention focused on the rules
changes Senator Bentsen mentioned, which many senators believed were
necessary to accomodate the arrival of television cameras. Senator Mack
Mattingly, a Republican of Georgia, insisted that rules changes accompany the
introduction of cameras: “I do not think it is an unreasonable request that we face
the issue of rules before spending this money on television equipment,” he said.
“I want to see how large the camel is before we let his nose in the tent. Once we
vote to install cameras, there will be no turning back.” (Mattingly, Congres
sional Record, February 6,1986, p. S 1105)
In a speech delivered February 6 in the Senate’s period of morning
business, and not as part of the general floor debate, Senator Robert Byrd of
West Virginia laid down three of what he called the compelling arguments for
Senate television.
First, he said, was the democratic reason—that the people of the United
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States have a right to know what transpires in their legislature. “We are doing
the people’s business here,” Senator Byrd said. “We do not need to fear their
scrutiny. The Senate is a body of able and intelligent people. When we have
given the public a chance to observe us closely, they have responded favorably.”
(Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6,1986, p. S 1108)
Secondly, Senator Byrd said, the Senate should allow television coverage
because the body was fast losing its power and role in American government.
This is what he called the “institutional” reason for Senate television. He cited
a statement by Speaker “Tip” O ’Neill who was asked if he would like to see the
Senate go on the air. “I’d be reluctant to see it,” O ’Neill said. “We’re getting a
10 to 1 ratio of coverage in the news.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February
6,1986, p. S 1109) Along with comparing the relative power and exposure of
the House and Senate, the senator expressed concern about “the visibility of the
whole legislative branch....We not only harm our chamber’s standing among
the electorate by not televising our proceedings; we also harm the standing of
the legislative branch of our government in relation to the executive branch.”
(Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6,1986, p. S 1109)
Thirdly, Senator Byrd made what he called the “educational” argument
for Senate television, citing the words of Woodrow Wilson who said, “the
informing function of Congress should be even preferred to its legislative
function.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, February 6, p. S 1109) Senator Byrd
said television could be an effective means for teaching children about govern
ment and Senate television could contribute to the public’s understanding of the
institution.
Throughout the debate, an informal group of about 12 senators, which
included Senators Byrd, Dole, Armstrong, Mathias, and Stevens, met to chart
the bill’s progress and discuss the rules changes the Senate might consider. On
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February 24, one of the groups’members. Senator William Armstrong, Repub
lican of Colorado, said, “As senators know, a controversy is really starting to
brew up over the question of the rule changes which had been attached to the
underlying television proposal, rules changes which in the view of some are
killer amendments.” (Armstrong, Congressional Record, February 24,1986, p.
S 1509)
On February 26, the Senate began voting on some of the amendments to
S. Res. 28. At the beginning of the day, Senator Dole showed some irritation that
the debate was dragging on longer than he anticipated. “I think we have just
about reached the point today where we ought to make some decisions. We
ought to either do it or not do it,” he said. (Dole, Congressional Record, February
26, 1986, p. S 1619) That day, Senator Armstrong’s amendment striking the
germaneness requirement passed, 60 to 37. As it turned out, that was the only
amendment considered, prompting Senator Dole to remark that “we have been
dragging this bone around long enough, a couple of weeks....I hope we can
come to a conclusion, because we have other items starting to back up on the
calendar.” (Dole, Congressional Record, February 26,1986, p. S 1669)
Despite an early morning warning from Senator Proxmire that “the
Senate is about to become a vaudeville act,” the Senate began its final day of
consideration of the television resolution February 27. As it stood at the start of
the day, S.Res. 28 allowed for television coverage and altered some Senate
rules. The bill set a 30-hour limit on post-cloture consideration; reduced the 3day rule on reports to 2 days; waived reading of a journal by a vote; eliminated
the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of treaties; and required that
conference reports be available on senators’ desks before the reports are called
up for consideration. The only major change was the rule which limited post
cloture consideration to 30 hours. The previous limit was set at 100 hours.
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During the day, the Senate easily disposed of three amendments. Senator
Johnston offered an amendment which would have allowed television coverage
only by unanimous consent. It was defeated 30 to 61. A similar amendment by
Senator Long, which would have allowed television coverage when agreed to
by a majority vote of senators, was also defeated, by 28 to 60. An amendment
offered by Senator Daniel Evans, Republican of Washington, which would have
required senators to vote from their desks, was shelved by a vote of 49 to 43.
As the Senate seemed on the verge of its historic vote around 7:00 pm that
night, Senator Boren, Democrat of Oklahoma, rose to offer two amendments
which he had not discussed with the leadership or floor managers. Boren, who
had not participated in any of the Senate debate until this point, intimated that
if his amendments were not accepted, he would force the Senate to extend
debate on a number of amendments he would then offer. Senator Ted Stevens,
Republican of Alaska, had managed the bill for most of the day. He reacted
angrily to the introduction of Senator Boren’s amendments: “I had a feeling
earlier that after 10 years of standing on the floor of the Senate, listening to what
I consider to be almost every kind of objection, we finally had found a way for
the Senate to accomodate modem communications.” (Stevens, Congressional
Record, February 27, 1986, p. S 1748) After some haggling, the Senate
leadership, with Senator Byrd acting as intermediary to Boren, agreed to accept
one of the two amendments, which called for a two week blackout period after
the television experiement’s completion July 15. Senator Boren wanted the
Senate to have a cooling-off period before it made a final decision on a
permanent television arrangement. The Senate accepted the motion by unani
mous consent.
With the Boren amendment out of the way, the Senate voted to pass S.Res.
28, by a vote of 67 to 21. After 9 days on the Senate floor, which consisted of
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roughly 25 hours of debate, six roll call votes, the consideration of nine
amendments, the Senate had at last decided it was time to try televising itself.
Senate technicians set to work to make S.Res. 28 a reality. By May 1, the
Senate went on the air, though the television signal traveled only a few hundred
yards to the Senate office buildings near the Senate chamber in the Capitol
building. While the televison pictures could still not be seen by the general
public, the Senate did make its radio signal available to the public immediately.
On that first day in May, Senator Dole said that “our experts tell me that the
technical bugs are being worked out and that our picture is a good one. I am not
certain about the debates, but at least I am advised that we look good.” (Dole,
Congressional Record, May 1,1986, p. S 5127)
In the interim test period when the television signal was only transmitted
to Senate office buildings, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,
and an ad hoc group of other senators interested in the television issue, met off
and on to consider various questions concerning proper decorum in the Senate,
now that the cameras would be rolling. As listed by Jonathan Fuerbringer, a
congressional correspondent for the New York Times, the questions included:
Should classical music be played during the many, often long, quorum
calls, or should only a graphic display, reading ‘The Senate is conducting a
quorum call,’be shown? Should hunks of Wisconsin cheese or other props, like
photographs of dairy cows, be allowed on the floor during speeches? Should
there be a clock at the bottom of the television screen during roll calls, and
should the clerk calling the roll call be in the picture? Should senators
speaking—the good, the bad, the handsome, and the not so—be shown in a tight
shot, or should the camera move back a bit to give some feel for the Senate
chamber, which often is all but empty? Should staff members be allowed on the
couches in the back, or would they become a distracting background to a
senator’s oration? (Fuerbringer, p. 1)
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Sometime later, Senator Ted Stevens summed up the question senators
had to address about decomm in the chamber: “If you bring in a bottle of milk,
pretty soon, you can bring in a cow,” he said. “The question is, what are the
reasonable limits of the use of supporting material such as charts?” (Stevens,
Congressional Record, July 15,1986, p. S 9060) Senator Stevens and some of
his colleagues may have been moved by what they saw as excesses of visual aids
displayed in the House in the previous seven years. These displays included
Representative Bud Shuster, Republican of Pennsylvania, waving a rubber duck
when talking about the “lame duck” Carter administration and Representative
Silvio Conte, Republican of Massachusetts, wearing a rubber pig snout around
his nose when talking about pork barrel legislation. (Omstein, p. 6) Although
some regarded these issues as trivial (“Never underestimate the insignificant,”
Senator Wendell Ford said), they did occupy a part of some senators’time as the
body geared up for the television experiement.
On the Senate’s first day of live television June 2, the headlines in major
newspapers told the story. “Some Laughs, Some Qualms as Senators Take to the
Air,” the New York Times proclaimed while the Wall Street Journal headlined
its story “‘You’re on the Air:’ New Call to Order in the U.S. Senate.” In the
words of television critic Tom Shales, “television, which comes to everything
eventually, came to the United States Senate yesterday, as the Senate began a
six-week grapple with this strange, new, one-eyed monster in its midst. In
Round 1, the monster won, but the grappler can be expected to hang in there.”
(Shales, p. B l)
The most quoted remark from the floor, which could now be seen in 25
million households courtesy of C-SPAN, and millions of homes via PBS for this
special event, belonged to Senator Dole, who said, “I think that today we catch
up with the twentieth century. We have been the invisible half of Congress for
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seven years.” In his typically glib manner, the majority leader also pointed out
in whose hands the ultimate fate of Senate television lay: “For the next six
weeks, the people will be watching us gavel to gavel and it won’t take them long
to get a handle on this place. We can get down to business and tackle the issues
of the day. Or we can fool around. It is up to us.” (Dole, Congressional Record,
June 2,1986, p. S 6446)
Senator Byrd seized the occasion to once more trace the Congress’
involvement with advances in communications. “Today, as the U.S. Senate
comes out of the dark ages, we create another historic moment in the relation
ship between Congress and technological advancements in communications
through radio and television,” Senator Byrd said. (Byrd, Congressional Record,
June 2,12986, p. S 6447) Hoping the Senate could summon the good thinking
of the American people, an argument Byrd used during the Panama CanalTreaty
debates in 1977 to allow radio coverage of Senate debates, the minority leader
quoted from the French statesman Talleyrand: “There is more wisdom in public
opinion than in Napolean, Voltaire, or all the ministers of state, present and to
come.” (Byrd, Congressional Record, June 2,1986, p. S 6447)
Viewers on this first day of Senate TV were also treated to seeing
arguably the Senate’s most rotund member, Senator Howell Heflin, Democrat
of Alabama, recite a sonnet written especially for the occasion. Its first lines
were (Heflin, Congressional Record, June 2,1986, p. S 6456):

Turn the spotlight over here,
Focus the camera at my place,
Pages, please don’t come too near,
Otherwise you just might block my face.

42

Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, made a rather complete list of
concerns he had about the effect cameras would have, and completed his
remarks by giving his fellow senators a demonstration of how to apply pancake
makeup to his balding head. As he finished work on his scalp, Senator Glenn
said, “Mr. President, I would hasten to add that personally, of course, I plan to
do nothing different.” (Glenn, Congressional Record, June 2,1986, p. S 6456).
In all, 10 senators made remarks about Senate television on its first day of
existence.
In the wake of the Senate TV debut, Ralph Griffith, who oversaw the
installation of the Senate television operation, spoke on a C-SPAN call-in
program about some of the changes the Senate had made in its appearance to
accomodate the cameras:
We’ve already changed just a little—we’ve shortened the flagpole in
there six inches just because the bottom of it was a little too high off the speaker’s
desk. We’ve also put a new curtain in behind the presiding officer. The old
curtain was a dark blue, and it was so blue it was black [on TV]. It just absorbed
all the light and the flesh tones weren’t really natural. But I think our job is to
produce a daily documentary as opposed to a soap opera or a news show. We’re
more concerned with trying to get people involved and show them what’s going
on in the Senate.” (“The Inside Story,” p. 2)
Despite Senator Boren’s efforts February 27 to lock the Senate into atwoweek blackout period before moving to consider a permanent television
arrangement, that intention fizzled July 15 as the Senate amended the language
of S.Res. 28 to allow only four days of blackout, from July 16 to July 20. The
motion passed by unanimous consent. On the first day of the blackout July 16,
Senator Dole said that “it is obvious that without TV in the Senate, which we will
be without today...that it is a little dark in here.. .1 cannot believe that we really
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worked in this place all those years in the dark.” (Dole, Congressional Record,
July 16, 1986, p. S 9095) Senator Proxmire viewed the change in lighting
differently: “The lighting is more relaxing. I always work better in the dark, and
I think a lot of other people do, too. They accuse Democrats of working better
in the dark but I think that is true of Republicans also— maybe a little more so.”
(Proxmire, Congressional Record, July 16,1986, p. S 9099)
As the Senate began final debate on S.Res. 28 July 29, it was apparent that
passage was a foregone conclusion. It was not the climactic event that some
imagined. For a time, it seemed that S.Res. 28’s floor managers, Senators
Mathias and Ford, were having a difficult time finding members to speak on the
resolution. The Senate was empty most of the day, with many senators in New
York attending the funeral of American statesman Averill Harriman and others
preoccupied with the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings considering the
nomination of William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
(MacKenzie, p. 1) Although 12 hours of debate had been allotted to consider
making Senate television permanent, little of the time was used. The major
development of the day was that Senator Mathias’ Rules Committee had
announced some regulations regarding senators’ behavior before the cameras.
The committee limited visual displays to charts, pictures, and photographs only,
with the size of the visual aids restricted to 24 inches by 30 inches. The displays
could be used only on standing easels at designated points in the rear of the
Senate chamber. (MacKenzie, p. 1)
With those final details disposed of, and the Senate for the last time
hearing the pleas of television opponents Senators Proxmire, Danforth, Long,
and Johnston, the Senate reaffirmed its judgment of February 27 and gave
television cameras a permanent resting place in the balconies of the United
States Senate. The vote was 67 to 21.

CHAPTER m
WHY DID S. RES. 28 PASS THE SENATE?
The question this chapter will examine is straightforward: Why did the
Senate decide to televise itself in 1986?
This paper sets out a simple thesis question to examine this matter: did
changes in the Senate’s membership from the early 1980s until 1986 foster a
new attitude in the body more amenable to allowing television coverage? Given
that there were just four votes on Senate television in the decade (excluding
those on amendments to the final bill), we will analyze the support and
opposition to Senate television from two perspectives. The first perspective will
be from April 20,1982, when the Senate resisted invoking cloture to choke off
debate on Senate Resolution 20. The move to invoke cloture at the time was
sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and other supporters of
Senate television. The vote failed 47 to 51, four votes shy of a majority and 13
votes short of passage. The other perspective is from February 27,1986, when
the Senate voted 67 to 21 to allow the television experiment to begin. This was
an up or down vote on Senate Resolution 28.
Prior to examining these votes, a word on the selection of these two dates.
It must be noted that a comparison of these votes without regard to the political
circumstances and the points at which they occured on the political calendar
would lack the sophistication demanded of us. These votes took place at
different times, under different circumstances, and under different sets of
political conditions. More importantly, we must realize that a senator’s vote on
cloture and on passage of a bill may denote markedly different sets of
motivations. A senator’s motivations for voting a certain way on cloture are not
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as easy to devise as they are when one looks at a straight up or down vote. A vote
on cloture is not a vote against a given bill per se. A senator may actually be in
favor of the bill under consideration but simply want to hear more debate or he
may be supporting his floor leader on a matter with which he has not immersed
himself. Also, many times votes on cloture can involve matters of Senate
scheduling and partisan considerations, hence leaving some senators more
likley to support their party leadership. In short, strong feelings against the
merits of legislation may not be assumed from a vote against cloture, although
those feelings may likely exist. On the other hand, a vote like the one February
27, 1986, on the Senate television experiment, lends itself to drawing firm
conclusions. To see how a senator felt about an issue one would simply have to
consult the roll call sheet for an answer.
While there are some acknowledged drawbacks to this method, a com
parison of these two votes will be instructive. We may not be able to know with
certainty each senator’s state of mind or motivation to vote a certain way. But
it is hoped that the comparison will yield a general sense of why some senators
changed their minds about allowing television coverage and how the entrance
and exit of specific senators from the scene may or may not have furthered the
cause of Senate television.
First, to the numbers (See Figures 1-1 and 1-2 on pages 46 and 47 for the
final results of the 1982 and 1986 rollcall votes). An examination of these two
votes yields the following results:
• Of the 76 senators who voted on both occasions in 1982 and 1986, some
30 changed their vote, 25 from voting not to invoke cloture and then four years
later voting for Senate television. Five senators voted to invoke cloture and then
voted in 1986 against Senate television. Forty-six senators did not change their
votes, 34 voting to invoke cloture in 1982 and for Senate television and 12

F igure 1
April 20, 1982 Vote to Invoke Cloture on Senate Resolution 20, Providing
For Television and Radio Coverage of Senate Floor Proceedings. Year
Elected Follows Name.
Y E A S — 47
Republicans (37)
James Abdnor (R-S.D.)—1980
Mark A ndrew s (R-S.D.)—1980
William A rm strong (R-Colo.)—1978
H ow ard Baker (R-Tenn.)—1966
N icholas Brady (R-N.J.)—1981
John Chafee (R-R.I.)—1976
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)—1978
William Cohen (R-Maine)—1978
Jake G am (R-Utah)—1974
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)—1980
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—1980
Orrin H atch (R-Utah)—1976
M ark H atfield (R-Ore.)—1966

Paula H aw kins (R-Fla.)—1980
S.I. H ayakaw a <R-Calif.)— 1976
John Heinz (R-Pa.)—1976
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)—1978
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)—1978
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)—1980
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)—1976
Charles M athias (R-Md.)— 1968
James McClure (R-Idaho)—1972
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)—1980
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)—1980
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)—1968

Charles Percy (R-Ill.)—1966
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)—1978
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)—1980
William Roth (R-Del.)—1970
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)—1980
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)—1976
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)—1980
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)—1968
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)—1980
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)— 1956
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)—1976
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)— 1970

John Melcher (D-Mont.)—1976
H. M etzenbaum (D-Ohio)—1976
George Mitchell (D-Maine)—1980

D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)—1976
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)—1960
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)—1976

Democrats (10)
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)— 1974
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)—1970
D. D eCondni (D-Ariz.)—1976
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)—1978

N A Y S — 51
Republicans (16)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)—1978
A1 D 'Am ato (R-N.Y)—1980
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)—1980
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)— 1968
Pete D om enid (R-N.M.)—1972
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)— 1978

John East (R-N.C.)—1980
Barry Gold water (R-Ariz.)—1968
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)—1972
G. Humphrey (R-N.H.)—1978
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)—1974

Mack M attingly (R-Ga.)—1980
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)—1978
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)—1972
John Tower (R-Texas)—1961
John Warner (R-Va.)—1978

Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)—1968
James Exon (D-Neb.)— 1978
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)—1974
John Glenn (D-Ohio)—1974
Gary H art (D-Colo.)—1974
Emest Hollings (D-S.C.)—1966
W. H uddleston (D-Ky.)—1972
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)—1962
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)—1952
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)—1972
Ed. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—1962
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)—1974

Carl Levin (D-Mich.)—1978
Russell Long (D-La.)—1948
S. M atsunaga (D-Hawaii)—1976
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)—1972
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)—1957
David Pryor (D-Ark.)—1978
Jennings Randolph (W.Va.)—1958
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)—1976
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)— 1976
John Stennis (D-Miss.)—1947
Ed. Zorinskey (D-Neb.)— 1976

Democrats (35)
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)—1978
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)—1970
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)—1972
David Boren (D-Okla.)—1978
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)—1978
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)— 1960
H arry Byrd, Jr. (I-Va.)—1966
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)—1958
How ard Cannon (D-Nev.)—1958
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)—1968
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)—1980
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)—1980

NOT V O TIN G — 2
John Danforth (R-Mo.)

Paul Tsongas (D-Mass.)

Figure 2
February 27, 1986 Vote on Senate Resolution 28, Providing For
Experimental Television and Radio Coverage of Senate Floor
Proceedings. Year Elected Follows Name.
Y E A S — 67
Republicans (35)
James Abdnor (R-S.D.)—1980
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)—1980
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)—1978
John Chafee (R-R.I.)—1976
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)—1978
William Cohen (R-Maine)—1978
A1 O 'Amato (R-N.Y.)—1980
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)—1980
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)—1968
Pete D om enid (R-N.M.)—1972
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)—1983
Jake Garn (R-Utah)—1974

Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)—1980
Phil Gramm (R-Texas)—1984
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)—1976
Paula H awkins (R-Fla.)—1980
John Heinz (R-Pa.)—1976
Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)—1978
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)—1980
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)—1976
Charles M athias (R-Md.)—1968
James McClure (R-Idaho)—1972
Frank M urkowski (R-Alaska)—1980
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)—1980

Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)—1978
William Roth (R-Del.)—1970
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)—1978
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)—1980
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)—1968
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)—1980
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)—1956
Paul Trible (R-Va.)—1982
John W arner (R-Va.)—1978
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)—1970
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)—1982

Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)—1974
John Glenn (D-Ohio)— 1974
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)—1984
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)—1984
Gary H art (D-Colo.)—1974
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)—1978
Ed. Kennedy (D-Mass.)—1962
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)—1982
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)— 1974
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)—1978
Spark M atsunaga (D-Hawaii)—1976

John Melcher (D-Mont.)—1976
H. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)—1976
George Mitchell (D-Maine)—1980
D.P. M oynihan (D-N.Y.)—1976
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)—1960
David Pryor (D-Ark.)—1978
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)—1976
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)—1976
Paul Simon (D-Ill.)—1984
Ed. Zorinskey (D-Neb.)—1976

Democrats (32)
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)—1978
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)—1970
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)—1972
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)—1982
David Boren (D-Okla.)—1978
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)—1978
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)—1958
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)—1970
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)—1968
Dennis DeCondni (D-Ariz.)—1976
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)—1980

N A Y S — 21
Republicans (14)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)—1978
John Danforth (R-Mo.)—1976
John East (R-N.C.)—1980
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—1980
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)—1966

Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)—1982
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)—1972
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)—1974
Mack M attingly (R-Ga.)—198Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)—1984

Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)—1980
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)—1980
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)—1972
Malcolm W allop (R-Wyo.)—1976

Russell Long (D-La.)—1948
Sam N unn (D-Ga.)—1972

William Proxmire (D-Wis.)—1957
John Stennis (D-Miss.)—1947

Democrats (7)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)—1960
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)—1966
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)—1972

NOT V O TING— 12
Republicans (4)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)—1978
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz)—1968

Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)—1978

Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)—1968

James Exon (D-Neb.)—1978
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)—1962
John Kerry (D-Mass.)—1984

Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.)—1984
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)—1976

Democrats (8)
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)—1974
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)—1980
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)— 1968
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senators voting no on both occasions.
•Of the 11 senators who entered the Senate after the 1982 vote, nine voted
for Senate television and two voted against in 1986.
•Of the 12 who departed the Senate between 1982and 1986, six voted for
invoking cloture in 1982 and six voted against.
•Of the 12 senators who were absent from the 1986 vote, two had not been
in the Senate in 1982, three had voted to invoke cloture in 1982, and seven voted
against invoking cloture in 1982.
•Of the two senators not voting in the 1982 vote, one had retired from the
Senate by 1986 and the other voted no in 1986.
These numbers provide a broad sketch of how the Senate’s membership
changed from 1982 to 1986, but a closer look at the personalities involved will
yield a fuller and more telling picture. The focus of this chapter will be on those
senators who came into the Senate after the 1982 television effort, offering their
support of the idea of Senate television, and on those who left the Senate after
1982, whose departure helped guarantee the passage of Senate Resolution 28 in
1986.
While their number may be small, we should begin with what is arguably
the most significant group who helped alter the Senate’s mindset about televis
ing itself: those 11 members who entered the Senate after the 1982 cloture vote.
Of these 11, nine supported Senate Resolution 28. This group included Senators
Jeff Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico, Daniel Evans, Republican of
Washington, Albert Gore Jr., Democrat of Tennessee, Phil Gramm, Republican
of Texas, Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa, Frank Lautenberg, Democrat of New
Jersey, Paul Simon, Democrat of Illinois, Paul Trible, Republican of Virginia,
and Pete Wilson, Republican of California. Two of the 11 voted against Senate
television. They were Senators Chic Hecht, Republican of Nevada, and Mitch
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McConnell, Republican of Kentucky. (See Figure 1-3 on page 50 for a break
down of the ages of those senators in this group who voted for Senate Resolution
28).
Of these 11 men, Senate television picked up a sum total of seven
supporters. Along with those numbers, though, came a mindset from a group
who had had extensive experience with televsion. Five of this group (Senators
Gore, Gramm, Harkin, Simon, and Trible) had experience doing legislative
work in front of television cameras in the House. While they may be only five
in number, these senators exemplified one of the key arguments which was
continually made during a decade of debate: that the House would eclipse the
Senate in terms of visibility and eventually power if the Senate did not go on
television. Each of these senators were supporters of House television. They
saw it through its legislative labryinth to passage, worked at learning the new
video politics, through the exposure and media savvy they gained from House
television each won election to the Senate at relatively young ages, and played
a role in the passage of Senate television. A brief biographical look at each of
these five senators may be helpful in understanding some of the attitudnal
changes the Senate underwent in the 1980s.
Senate Albert Gore Jr. replaced retiring Majority Leader Howard Baker
in the Senate in the election of 1984. Gore spent four terms in the House from
1976 to 1984, where he saw firsthand the passage of House television and made
the first speech televised from the House floor. While serving in the House, Gore
made no secret of his higher political ambitions to run for Senate. When he
entered the Senate in 1984, he made no secret of his desire to run for president.
(Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p. 1248) He ran unsuccessfully for the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1988. Congressio/wz/ Quarterly has pointed out that
Gore typifies a newer age politician. “Gore spent most of his pre-congressional

F ig u r e 3

Ages of Senators When Entering the Senate—Those Who Voted For
Senate Resolution 28 in 1986 and Were Not Present for the 1982 Cloture
Vote

Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)____________________________ 39
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)____________________________ 57
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)___________________________ 36
Phil Gramm (D-Texas)_____________________________ 42
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)_____________________________ 45
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)__________________________ 58
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)______________________________ 49
Paul Trible (R-Va.)_________________________________ 37
Paul Simon (D-Ill.)_________________________________ 56

Average Age.

46.6
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career as a reporter, and he brought the skills and interests of a journalist with
him to the House in 1977. Few there could match his ability to seize an issue,
uncover a pattern of abuses, draw attention in the media and propose a solution.”
(Duncan, p. 1392-93)
Senator Phil Gramm gained national prominence as a member of the
House when he sponsored some of the Reagan administration’s budget bills in
1981. As a relatively junior member of the House, he had served just three years
there, Gramm connected his name (in the form of the Gramm-Latta I and II
budget bills) with the hopes of the new administration’s fiscal policies, captur
ing attention of many veteran political observers including Hedrick Smith who
wrote that “Gramm’s media skills got him wide political notice and legislative
results.” (Smith, p. 39). He showed similar political adroitness when he changed
parties in 1983, resigning, and then calling for a new election. (Barone and
Ujifusa 1986, p. 1280) This tactic enabled Gramm to appear honorable and
honest, while at the same time catching would-be opponents off guard with little
time to raise funds or organize campaigns. Some have noted Gramm’s impact
on the national political scene in a relatively short political career. “The fact
remains that in less than a decade Gramm combined politically powerful ideas,
good timing and boundless tenacity to enact two landmark laws that have
shaped budget debates for the 1980s and beyond.” (Duncan, p. 1424) Before
entering politics, Gramm was an economics professor at Texas A&M.
Senator Tom Harkin has been widely credited with inventing what is now
an oft-imitated way of gaining media attention when a member of Congress is
in his home district or state: “the work day.” In his 1974 campaign for the House,
his first election, Harkin would work a dozen or more jobs in a day, attempting
to gain attention and identify himself with voters. He would work part of a day
as a truck driver, part as a gas station attendant “and in other blue collar work
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to persuade voters of his empathy with their concerns.” (Ehrenhalt, p. 529)
Harkin served in the Navy and as a practicing attorney before winning a seat in
Congress in 1974. He won his Senate seat in 1984.
Like other members of the Senate’s class of 1984, Senator Paul Simon
brought with him experience in the media. Simon worked as the editor and
publisher of the Troy (III.) Tribune and had experience as an owner of a weekly
newspaper chain for some 19 years. Along with army service, Simon worked in
the Illinois State House and Senate, served as Illinois’ lieutenant governor and
served 10 years in the House of Representatives before his 1984 election to the
Senate. Prior to his arrival in the Senate, Simon had already carved out a unique
personality with the media and with his colleagues on Capitol Hill—“with his
bow ties, deep voice, and nasal accent, he is a distinctive figure.” (Barone and
Ujifusa 1986, p. 386)
Senator Paul Trible, like the other senators mentioned above, served what
amounted to an apprenticeship in the House, from 1976 to 1982, before winning
his seat in the Senate. Trible demonstrated political adeptness winning his
House seat in 1976 and making more progress in his political career than even
he could have expected, given the fact that he had little political experience and
had spent little time as a resident of his district. (Barone and Ujifusa 1986, p.
1376) In his 1982 Senate campaign, Trible proved himself a more than adequate
fundraiser, far outdoing his opponent, while at the same time demonstrating the
drive and ambition which was evidently lacking in his opponent. (Barone and
Ujifusa 1986, p. 1376)
These brief sketches point up some traits these five senators share. Youth
and ease with television are evident in each of these men. Entering the Senate
at relatively young ages (Gore-age 37; Gramm-age 43; Harkin-age 46;
Trible-age 37; Simon-age 57), each man grew up in an entirely different
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political environment than did the senators they succeeded. These men were in
their teens when some of the first volatile mixtures of television and politics
exploded on the national scene: Both the Kefauver and McCarthy hearings
unfolded in their youth. It was a given to them that television would play an
integral part of politics of their adulthood—they could see it and they experi
enced it. These men all came to Washington at a time when television was
drastically altering the dynamics of power in the Congress. According to
Hedrick Smith, “Television fuels the independence of individual politicians,
and that compounds the problems of congressional leaders in rounding up
majorities. The trend in television politics is for candidates to build their
personal mass appeal and political organizations, bypassing their regular party
apparatus. Once they arrive in Congress, candidates who get elected as political
Lone Rangers are less responsive to party leaders.” (Smith, p. 36)
It should be noted further that in their formative political years, the
dominant figure in American politics for this group of senators was John F.
Kennedy. Hedrick Smith pointed out the significance of Kennedy’s rise to the
presidency. “John F. Kennedy, a lackluster senator impatient with inside
politics, was the first to market glamor politicking on T V .. .This is not to say that
Kennedy and others have lacked substantive achievements; merely that video
appeal was central to their rise to prominence.” (Smith, p. 38) David Halberstam
observed that “television loved him, he and the camera were bom for each other,
he was its first great political superstar; as he made television bigger, it made him
bigger... .His presidency made owning and watching a television set politically
mandatory.” (Halberstam, p. 444)
While Senators Gore and Simon had hands-on experience working in the
media, the others became active in politics and quickly learned how to use the
media to achieve their desired political ends. Senator Harkin’s initial use of
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“work-days” was successful and subsequently imitated by others, most notably
Senator Bob Graham, a Democrat of Florida who used the tactic widely as a
governor and continues to as a senator. He and the other members of this select
fraternity learned how to work the media, what their needs were, how they
worked, what their deadlines were, and how they could translate this knowledge
into exposure for themselves and their causes. This group’s media savvy, and its
impact on the 1986 vote on Senate television, becomes still clearer when
compared to some of the members who left the Senate after voting against
cloture in 1982.
Twelve senators who voted on cloture in 1982 were not in the Senate in
1986. Of the 12 who left, six voted for and six voted against cloture. The six
voting for cloture, and with the backers of Senate television led by Senator
Howard Baker, were Senator Baker himself, and Senators Nicholas Brady,
Republican of New Jersey, S.I. Hayakawa, Republican of California, Roger
Jepsen, Republican of Iowa, Charles Percy, Republican of Illinois, and Harrison
“Jack” Schmitt, Republican of New Mexico. The six voting against cloture were
Senators Harry Byrd Jr., Independent of Virginia, Howard Cannon, Democrat
of Nevada, Walter Huddleston, Democrat of Kentucky, Henry Jackson, Demo
crat of Washington, Jennings Randolph, Democrat of West Virginia, and John
Tower, Republican of Texas. While these numbers appear on the surface to show
that this group’s departure from the Senate was, if anything, “a wash,” that view
would not be entirely accurate. For by looking beyond the numbers, which
indicates no change in the overall vote count brought on by this group’s
departure, it can be argued that television’s cause in the Senate was greatly aided
by the departure of these members. Most of these men had little direct
experience with television and were as a group older and less accustomed to the
use of television in furthering their political aims. Some brief biographical
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sketches of this group will make the contrast between these older senators and
their replacements more evident. (See Figure 1-4 on page 56 for a breakdown
of the ages of this group of senators when they left the Senate)
Senator John Tower, 56 at the time of the cloture vote, came to the Senate
after a career in the Navy and as a professor of government at Midwestern
University. His first bid for elective office was in 1960 when he ran unsuccess
fully for the Senate against Lyndon Johnson, who ran for Vice President and his
Texas senate seat at the same time. Tower won the special election in 1961 and
subsequently served three terms in the Senate, serving for a time as the chairman
of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee. Tower “does not use his
charm to ingratiate himself with other senators, but he does have influence by
virtue ofhis hard work and brainpower.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982,p. 1051)In
1989, the Senate rejected Tower’s nomination to be the Bush administration’s
defense secretary amid allegations of alcohol abuse and potential conflicts of
interest as a result of his work as a consultant for defense contractors.
Senator Harry Byrd Jr., 67 at the time of the cloture vote, worked as a
newspaper editor before serving in the Navy during World War II and the
Virginia Senate for 17 years after that. He was appointed to the Senate in 1965
to succeed his father and was elected on his own one year later as a Democrat.
He later won re-election running as an independent. Like his father, some have
said Byrd had more interest in saving the government money than in having an
impact on national policy. “Like his father, he is parsimonious and concerned
about saving the government money. Unlike his father.. .he does not have much
impact on major national policies. He seems more interested in matter such as
his successful bill to restore posthumously Robert E. Lee’s citizenship, and he
seems to make no effort to persuade other senators to vote with him. Evidently
he sees his duty as showing up and casting votes.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982,

Figure 4
Ages of Senators When Leaving the Senate—Those Present for 1982
Cloture Vote But Departed by 1986 Vote on Resolution 28
Those W ho Voted Yea (6):
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)______________

59

Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)____________________________ 52
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)_______________

76

Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)______________________________56
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)________________________________65
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M)___________________________ 47

Average Age

______

59.2

Those W ho Voted Nay (6):
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)_______________________________ 68
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)_________________

70

Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)___________________________ 58
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)____________________________ _ 71
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)_________________________ 82
John Tower (R-Texas).______________________________ 59

Average Age.

68.0

57

p. 1122)
Another Senate veteran, Howard Cannon of Nevada, was 70 at the time
of the cloture vote. Like Byrd, Cannon was a World War II veteran. He worked
as a practicing attorney and a prosecutor in the Las Vegas City Attorneys office
before gaining election to the Senate in 1958. Senator Cannon enjoyed influence
as the chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee—Cannon was said to have
“an instinctive knack for getting things done and getting along with people on
Capitol Hill.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 656)
An army veteran of World War n, Senator Walter Huddleston of Ken
tucky was 55 at the time of the cloture vote. Prior to his first run for elective
office in 1965, when he ran and won his race in the Kentucky state Senate,
Huddleston worked in varying capacities, including as a sports and program
director, general manager, and partner, at radio stations within his native state.
In 1972, Huddleston ran for the Senate as the “hand-picked” choice of thenGovemor Wendell Ford and “to a considerable extent he owes his initial election
to Ford.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 406) Senator Huddleston was defeated
in 1984 by Republican challenger Mitch McConnell, who made effective use of
political advertising in his campaign.
Like others profiled in this chapter, Senator Henry Jackson of Washing
ton, 70 at the time of the cloture vote, became involved in politics following
experiences as a practicing attorney and later a prosecutor. He served six terms
in the U.S. House before his election to the Senate in 1952. Widely regarded by
members on both sides of the aisle as a tireless worker who had thorough
knowledge of the details of legislation, Jackson “turned out to be less than a
brilliant presidential candidate.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1145) Running
for the Democratic party’s nomination in 1972 and 1976, Jackson suffered from
poor political timing, running in 1972 as a supporter of the Vietnam War and in
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1976 as an experienced Washington insider when that approach was decidedly
unpopular following Watergate. (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1145)
Jennings Randolph of West Virginia is the oldest member of this group;
he was 79 at the time of the cloture vote. When he first won election to the House
in 1932, Randolph had experience on the editorial staff of the Clarksburg Daily
Telegram newspaper and experience teaching at the college level. He also
worked for 11 years as a lobbyist on Capitol Hill between stints in the House and
Senate, where he was elected in 1958. At age 76, Randolph surprised many of
West Virginia’s political observers by seeking reelection in 1978. “Randolph for
the first time used professional television advertisements and public opinion
polling.” (Barone and Ujifusa 1982, p. 1166) Randolph won reelection in one
of the closest races in Senate history over Governor Arch Moore. The margin
was 4,000 votes.
Of the many distinctions that can be made between these two generations
of senators, one stands paramount above any others: age. Of the six senators
profiled here, three of them were veterans of World War n . While the class of
Gore, Harkin, and Trible spent their youth watching and learning about politics
from television and the likes of the telegenic John F. Kennedy, none of this elder
group had that same experience. They learned about politics from newspapers
and radio. The commanding political figure of their time was Franklin Roosev
elt, whose mastery of radio was unparalleled. Roosevelt’s famous fireside chats
became a reassuring presence to the American people during 12 years in the
White House. “Read later in cold print, the chats seemed a bit limp and
pedestrian,” wrote historian James MacGregor Bums. “Read by Roosevelt over
the radio they sounded warm, intimate, lovely. Watching him deliver a fireside
chat, [Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor] Frances Perkins sensed that he could
actually see the families listening at the other end.” (Bums, p. 31) “He was the
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first great American voice,” David Halberstam noted. “For most Americans of
this generation, their memory of politics would be of sitting by a radio and
hearing that voice, strong, confident, totally at ease. If he was going to speak,
the idea of doing something else was unthinkable.” (Halberstam, p. 27) While
many of this older group of senators had experience working in the media, none
had experience with television. It is instructive to note that Jennings Randolph
made his first use of professional advertsing and public opinion polling in a
campaign in 1978. Such tactics had long before that become the staple, and to
some a necessity of campaigning.
This older group of senators were in the prime of their lives in the 1940s
and 1950s. According to the Theodore H. White, in 1950, only 4.4 million
homes in the United States had televisions. By 1960, however, when the
younger group of senators were first awakening to the world of politics, there
were 45 million television households in the country. And by 1980, when this
younger group of senators were at work in the halls of Congress, 80 million
American homes owned television sets. (White, p. 165) By 1982, White
surmised that “American politics and television [were] now so completely
locked together that it [was] impossible to tell the story of the one without the
other. Television in modem politics has been as revolutionary as the develop
ment of printing in the time of Gutenberg.” (White, p. 165)
To this group, politics was an insider’s game where knowledge, hard
work, and a substantive understanding of legislation would many times trans
late into influence and power. Men like Tower, Jackson, and Cannon cared little
for appearances. Each carved out fiefdoms of their policy and expertise (Towerdefense; Jackson-foreign policy and the environment; Cannon-commerce).
Each proved adept at the inside power games, while at the same time showing
a disregard for the new game of video politics that was quickly becoming a way
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of life in the Congress. As was noted earlier, this may have ultimately caught up
with both Jackson, who twice ran unsuccessfully for president, and Tower,
whose demeanor and lack of presence on televison have been said to hurt him
in his 1989 Senate confirmation hearings to become the Bush administration’s
defense secretary. Tower found that in-depth knowledge of defense weapons,
procurement strategies, and arms control could not overcome senators’ con
cerns about the “appearances” of his behavior.
Along with the differences in age, and the myriad implications of that,
one notes another difference in the politcal worlds of these two groups of
senators. In comparing the political biographies of these two groups of senators,
one can see a difference in what might be labeled the “closed-door” politics of
the 1950s and 1960s and then the more “open” or “reform-minded” politics of
the 1970s and 1980s. Where Walter Huddleston was essentially “handpicked”
by Kentucky’s governor to run and win his state’s senate seat, Tom Harkin
would years later work as a truck driver to generate media attention and voter
empathy with his candidacy. Where Harry F. Byrd Jr. was selected to succeed
his father in the Senate and, as the Almanac of American Politics pointed out,
“showing up and casting votes,” Senator Paul Trible worked tirelessly doing
mundane party tasks within the Senate to gain high exposure committee spots
like the assignment he gained on the Iran-Contra investigating committee in
1986. In short, the older group of senators were used to a politics of backroom
bargaining and intense knowledge of substance. The younger group of senators
had a keener interest in the media and television and a better sense of how to use
television to help them in their political endeavors. Their political world had
little use for the backrooms or favors from party bosses. Their political world
was one shaped in large part by the image they fostered through use of television.
This younger group of senators’ fondness for television is borne out by
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a detailed examination of the Senate votes in 1982 and 1986 (see Figure 1-5
through Figure 1-10 on pages 62 through 69). Regardless of one’s vantage point
in studying the votes, whether it be on acturarial or partisan basis, the Senate’s
more youthful members have been Senate television’s most ardent supporters.
For the purposes of this study and these charts, 1980 was selected as the
benchmark for what we will consider “a media politician.” Those who entered
the Senate in 1980 or afterwards are for the purposes of this thesis considered
“media politicians;” those who entered prior to 1980 are not. Nineteen eighty
was chosen, albeit somewhat arbitrarily, because it was the first congressional
election year after the arrival of House television March 19,1979.
A closer examination of the charts reveals the “media senators” prefer
ence for televised coverage of the Senate. For example, in the 1982 cloture vote,
68 percent of those elected in 1980 voted for cloture, while just 43 percent of
those senators elected prior to 1980 voted for the motion. (See Figure 1-5) In the
1986 vote on Senate television, 75 percent of the newer breed of senators voted
for the resolution. While that percentage is high, it is, however, comparable to
the percentage of the older generation of senators who voted for the resolution—
77 percent. (See Figure 1-6) Examining senators’ ages and party affiliations
together yields similar conclusions about the “media politicians” being more
likely to support Senate television. (See Figure 1-9 and Figure 1-10)
Looking at the partisan breakdown of the 1982 cloture vote, it is clear that
that vote was more partisan than the 1986 vote (see Figure 1-7 and Figure 1-8)
In the 1982 vote, 37 of the chamber’s 53 voting Republicans vote to invoke
cloture. On the Democratic side, 35 of the 45 voting Democrats voted against
cloture. In the 1986 vote, there was considerably less partisanship in evidence,
due in large part to the wide margin of passage of the bill.
This examination of two groups and generations of senators, those

FIGURE 5
Breakdown of 1 982 Cloture Vote— Separating T hose Who Entered the
S e n a te in 1980 and T h ose Who Entered Pre-1980
Those Who Entered Senate in 1980 (13 Yeas—6 Nays)
Yeas (13)
James Abdnor (R-S.D)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)

Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)

Nays (6)
A1 D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)

Chris Dodd (D-Conn.)
John East (R-N.C.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)

Those Who Entered Senate Prior to 1980 (34 Yeas—45 Nays)
Yeas (34):
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Jake Garn (R-Utah)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas)

Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Nays (45):
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.J.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)

Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
John Tower (R-Texas)
John Warner (R-Va.)
Edward Zorinskey (D-Neb.)

FIGURE 6
Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV— Separating Those Who
Entered the Senate in 1980 or Later and Those Who Entered Prior to
19 80
Those Who Entered Senate In 1980 or Later (22 Yeas—7 Nays):
Yeas (22):
James Abdnor (R-S.D)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)
A1 D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Phil Gramm (R-Texas)
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)

Paula Hwakins (R-Fla.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Paul Simon (D-Ill.)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho
Paul Trible (R-Va.)
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)

Nays (7):
John East (R-N.C.)—Nay
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)—Nay
Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)
Mack Mattinly (R-Ga.)

Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)

Those Who Entered Senate Prior to 1980 (45 Yeas—14 Nays):
Yeas (45):
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
Jake Gam (R-Utah)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
H owell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)

Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
James McClure R-Idaho)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
John Warner (R-Va.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Nays (14):
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)

Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Stennis (D-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)

FIGURE 7
Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote— Separating Senators B a se d on their
Party Affiliation
Republicans (37 Yeas —16 Nays)
Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (37):
James Abdnor (R-S.D)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Jake Gam (R-Utah)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Mark Hatfield (D-Ore.)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Kssebaum (R-Kan.)

Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Utah)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Republicans Voting Against Cloture (16):
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
A1 D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)
John East (R-N.C.)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)

Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Tower (R-Texas)
John Warner (R-Va.)

Democrats (10 Yeas—35 Nays):
Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (10):
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)

Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)

Democrats Voting Not to Invoke Cloture (35):
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)

Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Figure 8
Breakdown o f 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators on the Basis
of Party Affiliation

R epublicans
R epublicans V otin g For Senate
James Abdnor (R-S.D.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
A1 D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)
Jake Gam (R-Utah)

Resolution 28 (35):
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Phil Gramm (R-Texas)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Paula Hwakins (R-Fla.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)

Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
William Roth (D-Del.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Paul Trible (R-Va.)
John Warner (R-Va.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)

Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (14):
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)
John East (R-N.C.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)

Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)

Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)

D em ocrats
Democrats Voting for Senate Resolution 28 (32):
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)

Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)

Sparl Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Paul Simon (D-Ill.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Democrats Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)

Russell Long (D-La.)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)

William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)

FIGURE 9
Breakdown of 1982 Cloture Vote— Separating Senators B ased
Affiliation and Start of S e n a t e Service
Republicans (53)
Pre-1980 Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (24):
William Armstrong (R-Colo.
Howard Baker (R-Tenn.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Jake Gam (R-Utah)
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)
S.I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa)
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.)

Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.)
Charles Percy (R-Ill.)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)
William Roth (R-Del.)
Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting Against Cloture (12):
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.)
Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.)
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)

Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
John Tower (R-Texas)
John Warner (R-Va.)

1980 Republicans Voting to Invoke Cloture (13):
James Abdnor (R-S.D)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
Nicholas Brady (R-N.J.)
Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Paula Hawkins (R-Fla.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)

Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)
Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)
Areln Specter (R-Pa.)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)

1980 Republicans Voting Against Cloture (4):
A1 D7Amato (R-N.Y)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)

John East (R-N.C.)
Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)

FIGURE 9 (C o n tin u e d )
Breakdown of 198 2 Cloture Vote— Separating Senators B ased
Affiliation and Start of S e n a te S ervice
Democrats (45):
Pre-1980 Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (9):
Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
John Melcher (D-Mont.)

Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-N.Y.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)

Pre-1980 Democrats Voting Not to Invoke Cloture (33):
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
Joseph Biden (D-Del.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
Harry Byrd Jr. (I-Va.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Howard Cannon (D-Nev.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.)
James Exon (D-Neb.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Walter Huddleston (D-Ky.)

Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii)
Henry Jackson (D-Wash.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Sparl Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

1980 Democrats Voting to Invoke Cloture (1):
George Mitchell (D-Maine)

1980 Democrats Voting N ot to Invoke Cloture (2):
Alan Dixon (D-Ill.)

Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)

Figure 10
Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators Based on
Party Affiliation and Start of Senate Service

R ep u b lican s

(49)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting For Senate Resolution 28 (20):
William Armstrong (R-Colo.)
John Chafee (R-R.I.)
Thad Cochran (R-Miss.)
William Cohen (R-Maine)
Bob Dole (R-Kan.)
Pete Domenici (R-N.M.)
Jake Gam (R-Utah)

Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
John Heinz (R-Pa.)
Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.)
Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
Charles Mathias (R-Md.)
James McClure (R-Idaho)
Larry Pressler (R-S.D.)

William Roth (R-Del.)
Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.)
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.)
John Warner (R-Va.)
Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.)

Pre-1980 Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):
Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.)
John Danforth (R-Mo.)
Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.)

Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.)

Robert Stafford (R-Vt.)
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.)

1980 and Post-1980 Republicans Voting For Senate Resolution 28 (15):
James Abdnor (R-S.D.)
Mark Andrews (R-N.D.)
A1 D'Amato (R-N.Y.)
Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.)
Daniel Evans (R-Wash.)

Slade Gorton (R-Wash.)
Phil Gramm (R-Texas)
Paula Hwakins (R-Fla.)
Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)
Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska)

Don Nickles (R-Okla.)
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)
Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
Paul Trible (R-Va.)
Pete Wilson (R-Calif.)

1980 and Post-1980 Republicans Voting Against Senate Resolution 28 (7):
John East (R-N.C.)
Charles Grassley (R-Iowa)
Chic Hecht (R-Nev.)

Mack Mattingly (R-Ga.)
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)

Dan Quayle (R-Ind.)
Warren Rudman (R-N.H.)

Figure 10 (C ontinued)
Breakdown of 1986 Vote on Senate TV, Separating Senators Based on
Party Affiliation and Start of Senate Service
D em o crats

(39)

Pre-1980 Dem ocrats V oting for Senate R esolu tion 28 (25):
Max Baucus (D-Mont.)
Wendell Ford (D-Ky.)
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas)
John Glenn (D-Ohio)
Joseph Biden(D-DeL)
Gary Hart (D-Colo.)
David Boren (D-Okla.)
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)
Bill Bradley (D-N.J.)
Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.)
Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.)
Carl Levin (D-Mich.)
Alan Cranston (D-Calif.)
Spark Matsunaga (D-Hawaii)
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.)

John Melcher (D-Mont.)
Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)
D.P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.)
Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.)
David Pryor (D-Ark.)
Don Riegle (D-Mich.)
James Sasser (D-Tenn.)
Edward Zorinsky (D-Neb.)

Pre-1980 Dem ocrats V otin g A gain st Senate R esolu tion 28 (7):
Quentin Burdick (D-N.D.)
Russell Long (D-La.)
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.)
Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)

William Proxmire (D-Wis.)
John Stennis (D-Miss.)

1980 and Post-1980 Democrats V otin g for Senate R esolu tion 28 (7):
Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.)
Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)
George Mitchell (D-Maine)
Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.)
Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.)
PaulSimon (D-Ill.)
Albert Gore Jr. (D-Tenn.)

1980 and Post-1980 Dem ocrats V otin g A gain st Senate R esolu tion 28 (0):
None
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present in the 1982 Senate and those there in 1986, has been helpful in providing
a base of information on which to examine this paper’s thesis question. We turn
now to that task.

CHAPTER IV
AN OUTGROWTH OF SENATE TELEVISION: ‘THE INTERNAL COM
MUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN THIS TOWN’
The preceding chapter highlighted some of the differences between the
Senate membership in 1982 and in 1986. Did changes in membership influence
the outcome of the final vote on Senate television in February 1986?
After tracing the history of the media’s relationship with Congress, the
legislative histories of House and Senate television, and comparing the entering
and exiting senators of the 1980s, we are led by informed speculation to
conclude that it did.
The Senate of 1982 was significantly different from that of 1986. The
older members of the 1982 Senate, which had the first significant vote on the fate
of allowing cameras in the chamber, had less of the media savvy which
characterized the senators who entered the Senate in time for the 1986 vote on
Senate Resolution 28. This new group was younger, accustomed to a Congress
where there was more independence from the demands of party leaders, and
where their media skills played a critical role in their legislative and political
interests. By comparing the backgrounds of Senators Phil Gramm, Albert Gore
Jr., and Tom Harkin to men like Senators Jennings Randolph, Howard Cannon,
and Harry Byrd Jr., the contrast became apparent.
The research in chapter three also disclosed that this younger group of
senators came to age where the dominant political medium was fast becoming
television, with John F. Kennedy as television’s first reigning president.
Scholars and contemporaries of President Kennedy agree that he was the first
national political figure to fully seize the opportunities television offered. He
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was the first to offer himself for live, nationally televised press conferences. His
looks, self-assured manner, and sense of humor transformed his press confer
ences held in the State Department auditorium into major newsmaking events.
The older men who departed the Senate before 1986 had little experience
with television. They were more at ease with radio. After all, the first president
most familiar to these men as they grew up was the great master of radio,
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Like Kennedy, Roosevelt made himself available to the
press in a manner hitherto unknown. His nationally broadcast “fireside chats”
became household events during the depression. In their late teens and early
twenties, this group of senators could have heard Roosevelt’s voice reassuring
the nation about its economic health and destiny. So it was in radio, not
television, that this group of senators began their political careers. The contrast
between Kennedy and Roosevelt, and the medium each excelled at, gave a broad
idea of how these different groups of senators viewed television, their comfort
level with the medium.
While this thesis concludes that changes in the Senate’s membership
contributed to the adoption of Senate television, it is important to note that this
is but one of perhaps several factors leading to the passage of Senate Resolution
28. Along with the Senate’s change in membership, other events which took
place between the initial cloture vote in 1982 and the 1986 vote should be
considered.
Chief among them was the Democrats change of heart over this time
span. By examining the roll call votes in 1982 and 1986, we see that the number
of Democratic senators supporting television increased from 10 to 32. One of
the more revealing changes in the group was Senator Robert Byrd of West
Virginia, the Senate minority leader. Senator Byrd’s change of heart may have
indicated an attitudinal change within the Democratic party and its willingness
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to make changes in order to regain majority status in the Senate. Perhaps after
six years as the Senate’s minority party (the Republicans took control in the
1980 election), the Democrats had at last realized that they were in fact the
minority party and, if that situation was going to change, it would only change
if Democratic senators took positive, concrete steps to be competitive at the
polls. It would follow that adopting Senate television may have been a part of
the Senate Democrats’ overall strategy, thereby hoping to make themselves
more visible to the voters and more successful in elections.
In winning back control of the Senate in 1986, it is interesting to note that
the Democrats owed at least a portion of the credit to Senator George Mitchell,
a Democrat of Maine, who headed the Senate Democratic Campaign Commit
tee. Two years later in 1988, with Senator Byrd stepping aside as Senate
majority leader, the Democrats elected Senator Mitchell as their new floor
leader. His election was widely discussed in the press and within political circles
as a victory for a telegenic man, who could better present the Democrats’
positions on television and in the media. After a string of majority leaders like
Senators Lyndon Johnson, Mike Mansfield, and Robert Byrd, Senator Mitch
ell’s elevation to majority leader marked him in sharp contrast to this crusty
group of predecessors. It could even be argued that Senator Mitchell’s election
to his party’s senior leadership post marked the culmination of the Senate
Democrats’ plans to use television more actively in pursuit of political advan
tage.
Along with the partial explanations of why the Senate went on television
which have been offered in this concluding chapter, we must go beyond that to
examine the implications of Senate television. What has the introduction of
television meant to the way the Senate, and indeed Washington, works?
By allowing television coverage, the Senate caught up with the House in
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terms of having a national cable audience view its proceedings on a daily basis.
Although C-SPAN, which telecasts all House floor action, is available in 29
million more households than C-SPAN

n, which telecasts

all Senate floor

debate, the Senate is now at least on television, and arguably as visible as the
House is. Perhaps just as importantly, both the House and Senate can now be
seen on the nightly news of the networks, which regularly pull soundbites from
members speaking in both chambers.
Along with the enhanced visibility, the public can now gauge the
performances of their senators and the institution as a whole. Since 1986, the
issue coming before the Senate which took on perhaps the most public
prominence, with C-SPAN II and the Cable News Network providing unedited
coverage, was the nomination of John Tower to be the Bush administration’s
secretary of defense in February and March 1989. The public could see the days
of sometimes rancorous debate unfold, with much of the debate focusing on the
alleged soap opera-like activities of the former Republican senator from Texas.
A month after the debate, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia had some
observations on the nomination fight:
It was bitter. But not because there was television. As you know, I’m a
neanderthal and have been there a long time before television. I ’ve seen it bitter.
I’ve seen senators have to take their seats under Rule 19. That hasn’t been done
since television has been in the Senate. It has been bitter in the days when
Representative Foote drew a gun on Thomas Hart Benton of the state of
Missouri... .1 don’t think [television] excites the passions anymore than they’ve
been excited before. (Byrd, “Ten Years of Televising Congress”)
Along with restoring the Senate’s visibility vis-a-vis the House of
Representatives, and arguably better educating the public about the workings of
its government, televising the Senate established an internal communications

75

network among politicians, congressional staff, lobbyists, political journalists,
and grassroots organizers which was hitherto not possible. Members of these
different groupings of what might be called “political elites” could now
instantly communicate about the status of legislation before the Senate, the
performance of a key senator, or the attitudes of members of the Senate’s
leadership simply by watching them on C-SPAN

n. Thomas Mann, a scholar

at the Brookings Institution, has said that “C-SPAN and the televised proceed
ings of the House and Senate are now a central part of the internal communica
tions system in this town. It involves members, it involves staff, lobbyists,
journalists, issue activists—people communicate with one another. It’s the basis
for monitoring floor debate and congressional hearings. As a consequence, I
think members are better informed about floor debate and less reliant on the
information brokers.” (Mann, “Ten Years of Televising Congress”)
An anecdote from a recent book about the Supreme Court nomination of
Judge Robert Bork by Ethan Bronner, the legal correspondent for the Boston
Globe, illustrates how this internal communications network can work in
Washington:
After the [nomination] announcement [Federal Judge Robert] Boik
accompanied [White House lobbyist] William L. Ball HI, an affable southerner
with a honey-coated accent, to his West Wing office. As Bork settled into an
armchair, Ball flicked on the television to the C-SPAN [II] network, which
broadcasts live the proceedings of the Senate. He wanted to see if there was any
reaction yet to the nomination made less than an hour before.
There was.
Even before the picture blinked on, Ball and Bork could detect the
inimitable Brahmin accent of the senior senator from Massachusetts, Edward
M. Kennedy....
Watching the proceedings on a television was Kennedy aide Jeffrey
Blattner. He admired the way the senator unwound, delivering the statement
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with style and force. But he realized it was a risky speech. When it was over, he
said to himself, ‘Now we better win.’ (Bronner, p. 98-9)
As the story indicates, the impressions drawn on both sides of the Bork
nomination fight, both at the White House and in Senator Kennedy’s office,
were instantaneous. Neither side in this example had to rely on the media to tell
them what Senator Kennedy had said or the way he had said it. Members of the
Senate, and those whose lives revolve around those senators (including con
gressional staff, members of the executive and judicial branches, journalists,
and lobbyists), now had a vehicle in Senate television to provide them with
information they wanted veiy badly—an unfiltered and instantly reachable
channel to see for themselves how senators were voting and behaving.
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